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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Our motivation for this project has come from a desire to investigate the circumstances 
revolving around the trade in conflict diamonds in certain African countries and the world’s 
reaction towards this problem. As we undertook our research we became more concerned 
with the actual mechanics involved in the solution of this problem and how a self-governing 
system, or entity, as the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme could maintain its 
legitimacy, as the foundation on which it was created had changed dramatically, over the 
years that the scheme had been in existence. Furthermore this project presented us with an 
opportunity to apply a critical line of thinking towards our data.  
 
1.2 Subject 
 
The focus of our project is on conflict diamonds. This contains a description of the 
basis of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Our analysis will focus on two closely 
linked aspects: The mechanisms governing the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and   
the legitimacy of the Scheme.   
 
1.3 Definitions 
 
Alluvial Mining: The process of alluvial diamond mining involves digging and sifting through 
mud, sand and gravel using shovels, sieves, or even bare hands. Typically, diamonds come 
from geologic rock formations called kimberlites. Kimberlite rock formations that contain 
diamonds are eroded over time by rivers and streams and can deposit diamonds in the 
sediments carried by those streams farther downstream from the original source rocks. These 
deposits are called alluvial diamond deposits. The locations of these alluvial diamond deposits 
are controlled by the surrounding topography, drainage patterns, and the location of the 
kimberlites themselves. Alluvial deposits are often mined and exploited by small-scale miners 
using artisan mining techniques (USGS, 2007). 
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Artisan mining techniques: Working with simple tools and equipment, usually in the informal 
sector, and outside the legal and regulatory framework. Artisan operations are characterized by 
low productivity, lack of safety measures and high environmental impact. As a result, the 
majority of the artisan miners are very poor exploit marginal deposits with minimal returns, 
and are exposed to harsh and often dangerous conditions (USGS, 2007). Artisan diamond 
mining is used throughout West Africa, in conflict zones where mechanized mining is 
impractical and unsafe. Artisan diamond mining accounts for 90% of Sierra Leone's diamond 
exports and is the country's second largest employer after subsistence farming. It is also used 
extensively in Angola, the Congo (DROC), and Liberia (Khulsey.com, 2007). 
Conflict diamonds (blood diamonds): Conflict diamonds originate from areas controlled by 
forces or factions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments, and are 
used to fund military action in opposition to those governments, or in contravention of the 
decisions of the [UN] Security Council (UN, 2007). 
Country of origin: Means the country where a shipment of rough diamonds has been mined or 
extracted (KPCS, 2007). 
Kimberley Process Certificate: Means a forgery resistant document with a particular format 
which identifies a shipment of rough diamonds as being in compliance with the requirements 
of the Certification Scheme (KPCS, 2007). 
Kimberlite pipes: Diamonds form at a depth greater than 93 miles (150 kilometres) beneath 
the earth's surface. After their formation, diamonds are carried to the surface of the earth by 
volcanic activity. A mixture of magma (molten rock), minerals, rock fragments, and 
occasionally diamonds form pipes shaped like champagne flute glasses as they approach the 
earth's surface. These pipes are called kimberlites. Kimberlite pipes can lay directly 
underneath shallow lakes formed in the inactive volcanic calderas or craters (Khulsey.com, 
2007). 
 
NGO: A non-governmental organization is any non-profit, voluntary citizens' group which is 
organized on a local, national or international level. Task-oriented and driven by people with 
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a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of service and humanitarian functions, bring 
citizen concerns to Governments, advocate and monitor policies and encourage political 
participation through provision of information. Some are organized around specific issues, 
such as human rights, environment or health. They provide analysis and expertise, serve as 
early warning mechanisms and help monitor and implement international agreements. Their 
relationship with offices and agencies of the United Nations system differs depending on their 
goals, their venue and the mandate of a particular institution (NGO Global Network, 2007). 
INGO: Is an NGO that operates internationally.  
Rough diamonds: Means diamonds that are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted 
(KPCS, 2007). 
 
TNC: A trans-national corporation is generally regarded as an enterprise comprising entities 
in more than one country which operate under a system of decision-making that permits 
coherent policies and a common strategy. The entities are so linked, by ownership or 
otherwise, that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over the 
others and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the others 
(UNCTAD, 2007). 
  
1.4 Problem area 
 
Our problem area concerns conflict diamonds. To build up to the problem formulation 
we will describe the general parts on history and geography of diamonds. We will furthermore 
present empirical data on the diamond market, Diamonds in an African context, conflict 
diamonds and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. We will discuss why diamonds are 
important economically and how the diamond market is organised. Lastly we will describe 
why the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme was instigated and what its aims are.   
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1.4.1 History and geography of diamonds 
 
 Diamonds are mineral stones made of pure carbon crystal and considered to be the 
hardest natural occurring material. Because of this diamonds can be used to polish, cut or tear 
away any material used in drill bits, saws, or as an abrasive. In more recent history diamonds 
have been found to have semi conductive abilities and are excellent insulators. These qualities 
are used in advanced science and space exploration technology.  
  
 As gemstones, diamonds are sought after for their adamantine lustre and ability to hold 
a polish extremely well. 
 
 In the box below describes the qualities and criteria for pricing a diamond. Gem 
diamonds are valued according to the 4C's - carat, clarity, colour, and cut. 
 
Carat: The weight of a diamond is measured by the carat. One carat equals 0.2 gram. 
The price per carat does not increase proportionately with increasing size. Instead, there are 
sharp jumps around milestone carat weights. Therefore, a diamond of 5 carats is worth more 
than five 1-carat stones of the same quality. 
Clarity: The clarity of a diamond can be lessened by various kinds of imperfections. Among 
these imperfections are inclusions (other substances enclosed in the crystals), small bubbles, 
and small fissures or cracks. 
Colour: The best-quality diamonds (and the most valuable) are completely colourless allowing 
white light to pass through and be dispersed as rainbows of colour. Very few diamonds reach 
this standard. Most diamonds are tinged with colour. If a diamond's colour is sufficiently 
intense, it is prized as a gem and called a "fancy". Blue and pink diamonds are the most 
valuable. Red diamonds are very rare. Many diamonds have a yellowish tint caused by the 
presence of tiny amounts of nitrogen. 
Cut: A well-cut diamond will internally reflect light from one facet to another and finally 
disperse it through a top facet of the stone. Diamonds that are cut too deep or too shallow lack 
brilliance because light escapes through the sides or bottom (Harold Weinstein Ltd, 2007)  
  
  
Roskilde University  
The International Social Science Basic Studies, House 21.1, 3rd semester project - autumn 2007 
“Diamonds, Conflicts and Governance” 
Group 20: Maija Bertule, Jens M. Kring, Qillaq Nielsen, Lasse Degn, Hans Markus Borg Mogensen 
 
 
 7
 The first discovery of alluvial diamonds was made in around 800 B.C. in India. Trade 
in diamonds started within several different cultures. In the Roman Empire diamonds were 
used ornamentally as well as a primary tool for engraving i.e. jade stones. From the very 
beginning diamonds have been associated with luxury and exclusive lifestyle, as a symbol of 
ultimate wealth (National Geographic, 2007). 
 
In the nineteenth century know-how and technology made it possible to extract 
diamonds from the original source, kimberlite and lamproite pipes. Below left is a picture of a 
cross section of a typical kimperlite pipe. On the right is a picture of a typical alluvial 
deposition.  
 
Source: Wikipedia, 2007 
 
However extracting diamonds from the original rock sources is still a tedious and 
expensive procedure. 
 
“According to the Diamond High Council in Antwerp, Belgium, approximately “250 
metric tons of rock, sand, and gravel must be processed to yield one carat of diamond.” To put 
this in perspective, one-carat weighs one-fifth of a gram, while 250 metric tons weighs 
250,000,000 grams.” (National Geographic, 2007) 
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This includes finding a suitable geological area to commence mining in, which also 
requires extensive and expensive research. Arguably, mining for diamonds is only possible if 
the price-level is high and demand likewise.  
 
Like gold, silver and platinum, diamonds are among the precious materials, which we 
have traded with for centuries, but what separates diamonds from the other materials is the fact 
that you cannot melt-down, thin-out with lead or in other ways alter the characteristics of 
diamonds. This makes it a safe material, easy to identify and, unlike gold, easy to carry, 
compared to its value in weight.  
 
“Diamonds are not really a commodity like gold or silver,” a leading New York dealer 
explained to me one day. “You won’t buy a stone from a jeweller and then sell it back to him 
for the same price—he’s not going to give up his profit. But they are definitely the easiest way 
to move value around. I know a guy who had to leave Iran at a moment’s notice during the 
revolution there. No time to sell his house or get to the bank, but he had time to pick up 30 
million dollars’ worth of diamonds and walk away.” (National Geographic, 2007) 
  
 In 1866 diamonds were discovered in South Africa, which resulted in the great African 
diamond rush over the next century. From the very beginning of this diamond-mining era 
speculation and price manipulation has been an issue (National Geographic, 2007). An English 
entrepreneur, Cecil Rhodes, realised that with the sudden findings of these huge amounts of 
diamonds, the market would be in danger of crashing as it would be flooded by diamonds, 
hence the prices would decrease dramatically. He therefore started buying up land claims and 
diamonds in order to control the supply of diamonds. In 1888 he founded the DeBeers mining 
company, which over the next years grew into being the biggest diamond trading company in 
the world, mainly due to good advertising and the continued strategy of buying up land claims 
and diamonds wherever they could (DeBeers, 2007).  
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The legacy of Cecil Rhodes can be seen today as DeBeers claims a significant position 
in the diamond market. The following section will describe the unique characteristics of 
diamonds as a commodity.  
 
1.4.2 The diamond market  
 
The need for diamonds for industrial purposes has diminished due to the fact that 
drilling and engraving industries increasingly use artificially manufactured diamonds for their 
tools. This means that naturally occurring diamonds are predominantly used for jewellery, and 
consequently we will focus on diamonds as gemstones as opposed to diamonds for industrial 
purposes. 
  
 When describing the diamond market it quickly becomes evident that the market is 
organised in a unique way. It differs from other markets in the way that the diamond industry 
evolves around a few but very powerful players. For generations the South African based 
mining company DeBeers has had monopoly in an industry that sells $60-billion-worth of 
jewellery alone each year (Economist, 2004). Diamonds were discovered in The Orange River 
in 1866, and by 1893 De Beers had established a monopoly of the sale of diamonds on the 
world market (Berman, 1971). DeBeers once controlled 80% of supply of rough stones. More 
recently DeBeers controls around 55% (Economist, 2004).   
 
With this market share DeBeers is still able to maintain and increase the price of 
diamonds. This is done by controlling supply and combining the role of major distributor, 
marketing agent and buffer stock manager (Kelliher, 2007). This means that the natural 
competition within the market is lacking, giving DeBeers a great extend of control of the 
diamond industry: 
 
 “…The cartel pays careful attention to demand management, operating a highly 
successful worldwide advertising campaign. This campaign is aimed at attracting the 
consumer’s attention to the particular type of stone DeBeers needs to sell, corresponding to the 
composition of the buffer stock a point in time” (Kelliher, 2007)  
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The buffer stock has proven to be very successful in the case of Zaire in 1981, when 
they chose to independently market and sell diamonds. This had the result of DeBeers flooding 
the market with the same type of diamond making the price drop, and worthless as a good 
export commodity (Kelliher, 2001).  
 
Having monopoly entails some advantages. These advantages make it possible for 
DeBeers to react on any fluctuations in the market. The arrangement works like this: 
- Members of the cartel commit to selling rough diamonds only to dealers of rough gems 
controlled by the DeBeers group. 
- Rough diamonds are sorted by DeBeers into 5000 categories and divided into ‘boxes.’  
- De Beers sets the price and composition of each box in advance.  
- Every five weeks, 125 carefully selected partners, known as sight holders, are each invited to 
view a box and may purchase the whole box at a set price (this ensures that diamonds with less 
attractive characteristics can be ‘pushed’ into the distribution chain). 
- Sight holders may not resell the contents of their boxes to anyone except gem-cutting firms, 
at the risk of losing their privileges to purchase.  
(Chang, 2002) 
 
It is a fact that DeBeers runs most of the mines in South Africa, Namibia and 
Botswana. These mines have for a long time produced the majority of the supply of diamonds. 
DeBeers has also bought diamonds from mines not controlled by them, making it possible for 
DeBeers to maintain the myth of diamonds being a scarce resource:  
 
“For decades, if anyone had rough diamonds to sell on the side, DeBeers bought these 
too, adding them to the mix. A huge stockpile helped it to maintain high prices while it 
successfully peddled the myth that supply was scarce.” (Economist, 2004:2). 
 
When considering this fact it would be obvious to think, that the solution to the 
problematics of DeBeers having monopoly, would be to somehow open up the market for other 
actors. The result would be a competitive industry where the prices on diamonds would drop 
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dramatically because of the explosion in the supply. But as we shall learn this is very hard to 
realize.  
 
Up until 1870 diamonds were a scarce resource only found in riverbeds in India and 
Brazil. This meant that the prices of diamonds where high because of the high demand and the 
low supply. But as the diamond market in South Africa began to flourish the investors realized 
that their investment was in danger. At this stage DeBeers was formed (Chang, 2002). DeBeers 
introduced new production methods and a comprehensive mining system to control supply. 
The market was steady until a series of strikes in South Africa resulted in a competitive market 
with supply exceeding demand. Consequently DeBeers formed The Central Selling 
Organization which is made up by three companies: The Diamond Corporation, which controls 
large financial reserves and holds contracts with independent producers; the Diamond Trading 
Company, which handles the uncut gem-quality stones; The Industrial Distributors which sell 
diamonds not suitable for use as gems (Berman, 1971).    
 
But this stable and monopolistic system is about to fall to pieces. As mentioned in the 
beginning DeBeers has gone from 80% control to 55% control of the world supply of rough 
diamonds (Economist, 2004).  This development has changed the way the diamond market is 
organised. New players are entering the market, with the objective to get a piece of the 
diamond-cake. Mr. Leviev, an Israeli of Uzbek descent, has successfully build cutting- and 
polishing factories in Armenia, Ukraine, Israel and elsewhere. The way in which Mr. Leviev 
avoids DeBeers is to tell the governments of the states, in which he builds the cutting and 
polishing factories, that he wants the rough stones directly from the mines and not from 
DeBeers. In this way DeBeers is “missing” in the food chain which decreases their market 
share. The idea is that the government very much welcomes these factories as they create jobs 
and add value to the diamonds they export (Economist, 2004). Such a cutting- and polishing 
factory was built in Namibia using its own stones. Sam Nujoma, Namibia's president said at 
the opening of the factory:  
 
"To our brothers and sisters of neighbouring states, Angola, Botswana, South Africa, I 
hope this gives you inspiration to try to imitate what we have here." (Economist, 2004:5)  
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As described, the organization of the diamond market has changed very much in recent 
years and DeBeers has suffered from this change. But DeBeers is still the number one producer 
of diamonds, and in all this turmoil it is important to remember that adding players to the 
diamond market is not the equivalent to a decrease in prices. On the contrary, any rival firm 
share one big interest with De Beers: High prices. So even with a diamond market with many 
more players than today, prices on diamonds would not decrease. The price on polished stones 
has risen 10% in 2004 (Economist, 2004).   
 
1.4.3 Diamonds in an African context 
 
To day Africa continues to be the primary place of diamond mining with an estimated 
65% of the world's diamonds coming from African countries. The main diamond producing 
countries are: Botswana, Angola, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Namibia, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, South Africa (World Diamond Council, 2007).  
 
Source: USGS, 2007 
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The revenue from diamond mining in these countries is huge. In fact “approximately $8.4 
billion worth of diamonds a year come from African countries.” (World Diamond Council, 
2007).  
 
 Even though diamonds have had a malign impact on some countries in Africa, there are 
also examples of regions where diamond industries have helped creating economic growth. 
One of these examples is Botswana, which after its independence from Great Britain in 1966 
has grown from being one of the poorest nations in the world, to a country with a relatively 
high economic growth rate. This growth is mainly due to the fact that Botswana is rich in the 
Kimberlite pipes from which diamonds can be extracted. Furthermore the quality of diamonds 
mined in Botswana has a high standard, which makes Botswana the world’s biggest producer 
of diamonds, value wise (Engineering and mining journal, 2007). Diamonds constitute more 
than one third of the overall GDP, and 70 – 80 % of all export revenue. 
 
 The diamond revenue has increased the GDP per capita to 10.900 US$, only surpassed 
by one other African country, South Africa, with a GDP per capita of 13.300 US$ (CIA, 2007). 
 
 The Botswana diamond mining operation is a joint venture between the Botswana 
government, and DeBeers. One constellation in this venture is Debswana, a mining and 
diamond processing company. The company is the biggest in Botswana, employing 6.500 
people, or 2% of the total workforce, and it is the biggest mining company in the world, both in 
terms of size and output (Debswana, 2007).  
 
The Diamond revenue has helped build infrastructure, healthcare system (although the 
country is still struggling with a life expectancy of a staggering 34 years due to HIV/AIDS), 
and a well functioning education system (CIA, 2007).  
 
Overall it seems that Botswana is getting all the benefits from diamonds that the 
conflict areas have not been able to achieve, and that the “curse” of natural resources is not 
apparent. There are, however, indications that the current situation is not entirely 
unproblematic. The strong dependency of one – finite – natural resource makes the country 
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vulnerable to world market tendencies, price drops etc. This was seen when focus was first put 
on conflict diamonds. The bad publicity created by a few INGOs threatened to significantly 
affect the output of an entire nation state, thus making Botswana push for the establishment of 
the KPCS. 
 
Furthermore, the unemployment rate of almost 24% indicates that even though 
diamonds create wealth for the country as a whole, it does not have the ability to make the 
country utilise its workforce significantly, and induce economic growth in other sectors than 
the mining industry (CIA, 2007).   
 
1.4.4 Conflict diamonds 
 
During the 1990’s, several violent conflicts flared up in Africa and diamonds played a 
significant role in funding these conflicts. In Angola, the rebel movement UNITA (National 
Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and in Sierra Leone, RUF (The Revolutionary 
United Front) opposed government armies in open conflict for control of diamond mines. 
 
“By the mid to late 1990s, control over the diamond mines, particularly in Sierra Leone’s 
Eastern Province (i.e. Koidu and Tongo), was a major prize for civil war combatants. During 
this time, some US$300 million to US$450 million in diamond revenues were taken out of 
Sierra Leone—over 90% bypassing government coffers and exiting through illicit channels via 
neighbouring Liberia and Guinea as well as nearby Côte d’Ivoire (Grant and Taylor, 
2004:387) 
 
During the Cold War UNITA received economic support from, primarily, The United 
States, but as this international muscle contest drew to a close, the funding for UNITA 
dwindled. As a result of this the rebel movement therefore turned its attention to the diamond 
mines in Angola, which turned out to be very profitable.  
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“For instance, between 1992 and 1997, UNITA amassed US$3.7 billion in diamond 
revenues—far more than it ever received from the USA and its allies during the Cold War” 
(Grant and Taylor 2004:387) 
 
This did not come to the world’s attention, until Global Witness (an INGO) published a 
critical report on the matter. The critique was focused on the fact that the diamond industry 
indiscriminately traded diamonds from these conflict areas. When the report was published by 
Global Witness the diamond industry denied any relation or even knowledge about conflict 
diamonds. The report led to an increased awareness on a global scale, and after the UN and 
several governments acknowledged the problem, it led to the creation of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme. 
 
1.4.5 Introduction to the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme 
  
 The definition in the official homepage of the Kimberley Process states that: 
 
“…the Kimberley Process is an international certification scheme that regulates the 
trade in rough diamonds. Its aim is to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds, while helping to 
protect the legitimate trade in rough diamonds. The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
outlines the provisions by which the trade in rough diamonds is to occur. The KPCS has 
developed a set of minimum requirements that each Participant must implement (KPCS, 2007) 
  
 As mentioned, until the late 1990’s the illicit diamond trade took place with no actual 
international intervention or legislation to prevent it. Companies like De Beers controlled the 
market and were able to buy and sell diamonds from all parts of the world. By the mid 1990’s 
control over diamond mines in countries like Sierra Leone and Angola was a major interest of 
the rebel forces and corrupt government officials. With civil wars going on in many parts of 
Africa, diamonds may not have been the very reason of these conflicts, but they played crucial 
role in financing weapons and prolonging the conflict (Grant and Taylor, 2004). The conflicts 
had been taking place for years; however it was not until 1998 that this gained public attention 
on an international level. In 1998 Global Witness called for public attention to the illegal 
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diamond trade, following investigations in 1996 and 1997 concerning the trade of diamonds in 
Angola. A major step was publishing the report: “A rough trade: the role of companies and 
governments in the Angolan conflict” (Grant and Taylor, 2004).  
 
When these attempts did not result in action from the market players and governments, 
the INGOs launched a coalition: “Fatal transactions”1 in October 1999 with the aim to launch a 
public awareness campaign about the problems caused by illegal diamond trade. The campaign 
included a request to the diamond trade companies to make sure that the diamonds they bought 
came from sources not involved in civil conflicts. Also, they called for potential consumer to 
make sure that the diamonds they bought in jewellery shops come from conflict free areas. 
Later a similar campaign was also launched in the USA and it was the first time that illegal 
diamond trade gained international attention. DeBeers realised that this movement was a 
serious issue, which in the end could mean that the diamond industry went the same way as the 
fur industry. But as a profit-oriented corporation DeBeers was clearly not interested in 
customer’s boycotting them. 
 
The pressure put up by the INGOs and consumers resulted in DeBeers closing their office 
in Angola in October 1999 and it announced that the company would be reviewing its trade 
with Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea as well (Grant and Taylor, 2004).  
 
The numerous public campaigns, reports and the pressure by civil society resulted in the 
establishment of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. In May 2000 representatives 
from the diamond industry, INGOs and delegations from major diamond trading and producing 
countries met in Kimberley, South Africa, and started the process of negotiating how to tackle 
the problems of the illicit diamond trade (Global Witness, 2006). In December the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting the creation of an international 
certification scheme for rough diamonds (KPCS, 2007). The Kimberley Process was formed 
during the next three years, and launched in Ministerial meeting in Interlaken, Switzerland in 
2002 with implementation in January 2003. In the beginning it involved 35 participants but 
                                               
1 The coalition was formed by four European  NGOs – Global Witness, Medico International (Germany), The 
Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa and Novib (The Netherlands Organization for International 
Development Co-operation) (Grant and Taylor, 2004) 
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presently the number has grown and as of June 2007 it included 46 participants, representing 
72 countries (the European Community counts as a single participant) (KPCS, 2007). 
 
The way the Kimberley Process works is mainly based on the meetings between the 
participating governments and observers (the representatives from industries and INGOs), that 
are held once a year, and the work done by working groups monitoring the implementation of 
decisions, assessing new applicants, gathering statistics as well as helping with technical issues 
(Global witness, 2006). All of the decisions are made based on consensus – generally no blocks 
between participants are formed, rather there is a search for solutions that are acceptable for all 
of the participants (KPCS Third Year Review, 2006). Participants of the Kimberley Process are 
only allowed to trade with each other and they have to make sure that all the diamonds entering 
their market are coming from conflict-free zones and are accompanied by the Kimberley 
Process Certificate (KPCS, 2007). It is crucial to mention that the Kimberley Process is not a 
legally binding document in accordance to international law – it is based on the participant’s 
dedication and recognition that it is necessary to voluntarily fulfil the requirements of the 
scheme through an intergovernmental consulting mechanism, involving civil society and the 
diamond industry (KPCS Third Year Review, 2006). The full list of participants and an 
example of the certificate are included in the appendix. 
 
In general the implementation of the Kimberley Process is considered successful, even 
exceeding the general expectations. The amount of conflict diamonds on the market has 
decreased significantly and the countries participating report improvements. Nevertheless, it is 
extremely difficult to determine the exact amount of conflict diamonds still on the market, as 
many of the countries involved in the trade of conflict diamonds succeed in finding loop 
wholes to get the illicit diamonds into the legal market. The situation has improved in Angola 
and Sierra Leone, mainly due to the end of civil wars, so it can be questioned how much the 
improvement is actually a result of the Kimberley Process, or whether the civil war would have 
ceased to exist on its own. 
 
A positive development worth mentioning is the widespread international support to the 
Kimberley Process. Furthermore there is a distinction between legal and illegal diamonds, 
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which reduces the market and price of illegal diamonds and increases the risk of trading with 
illicit diamonds. The required certificate makes it more difficult for the conflict diamonds to 
reach the market. The majority of the rough diamond trade now is done through channels that 
are controlled by the Kimberley Process and the biggest diamond producing centres and traders 
are part of Kimberley Process 2.  
 
Despite the successes in these areas, there are still major problems to be faced by the 
diamond trade industry and the Kimberley Process. 
 
Despite the requirement that the participating countries should have systems of 
controlling the diamond trade, the Kimberley Process does not have any basic and common 
standards that the participating countries’ control systems should meet. Therefore some 
countries carry out procedures such as spot checks, while some do not. At present the 
Kimberley Process does not have a mechanism of suspension for the members that do not 
follow the requirements, but it is expected to be implemented in future. The Kimberley Process 
is not funded and is based on those who volunteer both time and resources and arguably are 
therefore not a sustainable system.   
 
 
 
                                               
2 Global witness and Amnesty international have made surveys of the success of combating the illicit diamond 
trade in the UK and the USA. 
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2 Problem formulation  
 
2.1 Cardinal question 
 
What were the mechanisms behind the instigation of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme, and how does the scheme fulfil the criteria of legitimacy that 
contemporary society demands? 
  
2.2 Research questions 
 
- What is the background for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme? 
- What are the aims of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and has it been 
successful? 
- Who instigated the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and what were the reasons 
behind this instigation?  
- To what extent is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme a product of a new form 
of global governance?   
- What are the criteria defining legitimacy in respect to the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme, and how does the scheme fulfil them?   
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3 Methodology 
 
This chapter will describe the methodology we have applied in this project. It will first 
describe what meta-theoretical approach we have chosen, since this approach can be 
considered the back-bone of our methodology. After this meta-theoretical introduction we will 
describe the type of data we have used in this project, and how we have worked with these 
data. It will include reasoning for our choice of data in an overall meta-theoretical framework. 
A reflection on limitations of the project will also be incorporated in the following sections.  
 
3.1 Meta-theory - critical realism in the view of Jesper Jespersen 
 
In this project we have chosen to apply critical realism to frame our problematic meta-
theoretically. This decision was made early in the project after having done the first 
preliminary empirical research based mainly on non-scientific literature and electronic media 
sources. It became clear to us that much of the material which was readily available to 
consumers, concerning both the diamond industry and the Kimberley Process, came from 
either the industry, countries which had strong economic interests tied with diamond trade, or 
INGOs which played an active role as lobbyists in order to create awareness about their case. It 
is possible to project positivistic notions on these data presented. An example is the claim that 
the percentage of conflict diamonds in the overall trade is now less than one. This number is 
presented and utilised in the promotion of diamonds in a quantitative fashion; the allegation is 
presented as if it was a binary digit, only having one other alternative: The ultimately false 
statement. Also, the notion of the diamond industry as having a natural science background 
added to our perception of the industry as positivistic. Even though geologists do not consider 
geology to be an exact science, they still operate within a quantitative outline: Either the 
kimberlite contains diamonds or not, both the diamond content, and quality of the kimberlite 
makes it feasible to commence mining or not, etc.     
 
Consequently, we were interested in applying a qualitative, critical, angle to the 
empirical “truth” presented to us. The angle which critical realism introduces has qualities that 
made us choose this approach for our project.  
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We have chosen to use Jespersen’s interpretation of critical realism. Jespersen is highly 
influenced by Karl Popper, and to a lesser extent Roy Bhaskar. This is most likely due to the 
fact that Jespersen focuses on critical realism in an economical context, where it can serve as a 
foundation for post-keynesian macroeconomic theory. However, the very nature of critical 
realism means that it does not confine itself to be applicable to just one of the social sciences 
(or any science for that matter). This interdisciplinary quality makes it suitable to apply to a 
project such as ours where geo-political powers, market forces, and socio-economic parameters 
create the entity, which is observed.   
 
Jespersen defines critical realism as a: 
 
“Scientific methodology which considers reality as an open (non-deterministic) system; 
the related social ontology is assumed to be empirically stratified.” (Jespersen, 
forthcoming:50)     
 
Even though Jespersen offers the definition above, he also states that critical realism is 
not a well-delimited theoretical scientific direction. 
 
An important notion in the methodology is that reality is affected by whoever seeks to 
investigate it (an open system). This means that the absolute truth can never be found. This, the 
researcher must be aware of before he commences to study a subject. 
 
Reality constitutes world 1 in the Popperian retroduction model, which Jespersen 
applies, and is the ontological basis of a given project. In the figure below it is referred to as 
“the real level” of the methodology. Also, this real level includes history and tendencies. This 
means that the researcher has to be aware of the historical context which the subject rest in, and 
whether it is moving in certain directions. This is an act of utmost balance, since the researcher 
must be cautious not to include or create axioms, which will undermine the empirical basis, 
while performing the study. Hence, an ontological reflection must be made.  
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(Source: Jespersen, forthcoming) 
 
World 2 is the analytical level in the model, and include the epistemological 
considerations of the project. It contains the theoretical background for the project, but the 
results of the analysis is also part hereof. The ontology is processed with the aid of theories in 
order to achieve the result, but it is important that there is a continuous evaluation of the 
ontological findings, in order to asses whether the initial interpretations have been correct or 
not. This is done “testing” these findings by applying theory to them. If there are any 
inconsistencies, the “reality” must be re-evaluated before the research can proceed. 
Inconsistencies does not necessarily mean that the researcher have performed badly; an 
essential notion of critical realism is that social systems are dynamic, thus making them 
impossible to observe if one uses too rigorous models.  
 
Besides the ongoing tests, there is another, perhaps more obvious bridge, linking world 
1 and world 2 in Jespersens model. This bridge he refers to as mapping. When ontology is 
applied to the epistemological level, Jespersen uses the metaphor “landscape” in order to 
emphasize: 
 
“…that we are working with a simplification of reality, that reality is a state of constant 
flux and that many other important conditions in addition to the purely economic, exert 
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influence over the shape of the landscape and the way in which it changes.” (Jespersen, 
forthcoming:3)  
 
In the above quote it is obvious that Jespersen had an economical angle in mind when 
he conceived it, but as we have argued previously, critical realism can be applied to all 
disciplines within the social sciences, or even beyond social sciences. Hence, the phrase 
“purely economic” could be replaced with “purely political”, “purely sociological”, etc.   
 
World 3 in Jespersen’s model constitute the operational level. It: 
 
“…consists of the knowledge that has been subjected to empirical tests that can 
contribute to uncovering the theory’s objective area of validity” (Jespersen, forthcoming:9) 
 
Jespersen also mentions Poppers contribution to the discussion of the theory of 
scientific method, where he pointed out that knowledge first becomes science when it has been 
subjected to validity testing (Jespersen, forthcoming). Apart from determining whether the 
analysis one has performed can be considered scientific or not, critical realism has a more 
pragmatic purposefulness to it as well; the result of the analytical work should end up in 
recommendations. 
 
3.2 Choice of data 
 
In our project we have mostly used literature sources from various reports, official 
documents and articles, and internet sources. Due to the specific topic of our research, we have 
not conducted any kind of quantitative research or interviews. This is so, because the question 
of legitimacy, in our view, can better be discussed using different data and putting them in the 
framework of the theorists’ discussions.  
 
Another way to acquire information and insight in the problematics of this project could 
have been to take contact to the involved organisations, as well as people who have been 
directly involved in the trade of illicit diamonds. Either this could have been used as the only 
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base of knowledge for the research, or it could have been used alongside the empirical findings 
within the literature we have been using.  
 
We are aware that some of the sources, as for example reports made by the INGO 
Global Witness, can be considered biased. However, we have chosen to use this information, in 
order to present all opinions from all levels of involved actors. As some statements from the 
diamond industry tended to be very optimistic, we think, that the critical view from civil 
society issued reports, helps to uncover the different sides of the discussion. Besides that, the 
civil society representatives, issuing the reports, were able to present valuable information, as 
they have been actively participating in the process, and taking part in the decision making 
process.  
 
3.3 Work Method 
 
During the research we have continuously been changing our focus as new knowledge 
was acquired and discussions taken place. Part of these discussions consisted of tentatively 
applying theories to the subjects we analyzed. The outcome of these discussions helped us to 
narrow down the focus of the project. This retroductive way of working was highly influenced 
by critical realism, and Jespersens divisions of the three worlds.  
 
To continue we will describe the central turning points which significantly shifted our 
focus. 
 
Originally our starting point for this project was an interest in how diamonds as a 
luxury commodity, and the diamond industry as a whole, played a role in funding civil 
conflicts in Africa. This meant that our point of interest became diamonds as a conflict 
commodity. In our research we became aware of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. 
This inspired us to analyse at what level the Kimberley Process have been successful, if at all.  
 
Part of this meant taking an in-depth look at the different actors involved in creation of 
the Kimberley Process and the interaction between these. In pursuing this knowledge we 
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became aware that the Kimberley Process is a new form of governance institution. Thus, the 
real issue was not whether the Kimberley Process had been successful or not, but how the 
Kimberley Process maintains its legitimacy.  
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4 Theoretical background 
 
 In this chapter we give a brief account of the theories that we have chosen in order to 
frame our project. The intention is to summarize the different theories, and provide the reader 
of this project with some background knowledge of the theories, which will be applied in the 
discussion chapters.  
 
 A problem field such as the one presented in this project, is far too complex and multi 
faceted to be framed by one theory alone. Even if such one theory, dealing with specific 
subjects such as the diamond industry, Kimberley Process, etc. were available, it is uncertain 
that a single theory would cover all aspects in a satisfactory manner. 
  
Hence, we have selected different theories that we use to analyse different aspects of 
our project. 
 
4.1 World Polity Theory 
 
The first theory is the World Polity Theory. We have chosen work by leading scholars 
in the field, Boli, Thomas, and Meyer, in our analysis. 
 
First of all the term “polity”, as used in this context, needs to be defined in order to 
understand the background of the theory. To do so, we have chosen Meyer, who defines polity 
as a "system of creating value through the collective conferral of authority" (Meyer 1980:111-
112). The obvious “world” in the name of the theory refers to the emphasis on international 
relations. Hence, the theory is also being regarded as part of the globalisation theories. 
(Lechner, 2007)   
 
 According to Boli and Thomas (1997) the dominant actors in contemporary world 
culture are states, trans-national corporations (TNCs), and intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) such as the UN. These actors wield economical, political, and military power, and in 
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most cases they do so in an overt way. Beside these actors – but also entwined with them – are 
the international non governmental organisations, or INGOs. The INGOs are: 
 
“…much less well-conceptualised actors whose primary concern is enacting, codifying, 
modifying, and propagating world-cultural structures.” (Boli and Thomas, 1997:173) 
 
As the above quote reveals, culture plays an important role in the theory. The authors 
emphasize the existence of a common world culture, and put up five principles that underlie 
the structures and ideologies of INGOs. The five are universalism, individualism, rational 
voluntaristic authority, human purposes of rationalizing progress, and world citizenship (Boli 
and Thomas, 1997) 
 
Universalism is a basic notion that humans everywhere in the world have similar 
desires and needs. Furthermore, they have common goals, and “can act in accordance with 
common principles of authority”. (Boli and Thomas, 1997:180) Often, the goal of INGOs is 
defined to benefit the common good of humanity as a whole  
 
Individualism refers to the way INGOs are governed. INGOs are usually accepting only 
individuals as members, or associations of individuals. An exception is trade and industry 
bodies, which have corporations as members.  
 
The members typically govern the INGO in a democratic, one-person, one-vote way, 
hence serving the interest of the individual. 
 
Rational voluntaristic authority is defined by Boli and Thomas as: 
 
“…responsible individuals acting collectively through rational procedures can 
determine cultural rules that are just, equitable, and efficient, and that no external authority 
is required for their legitimation.” (Boli and Thomas, 1997:181)  
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The way the organisations perform this kind of “self-authorisation” means that even 
though they have no formal sanctioning power, they often act as if they were “authorized in 
the strongest possible terms” (Boli and Thomas, 1997:181). 
 
The human purpose of rationalising progress refers not to progress in a materialistic 
manner, but rather a more diffuse development of individual self-actualisation, collective 
security, and justice. Rational social action is, according to Boli and Thomas, “the route to 
equality, comfort, and the good life” (Boli and Thomas, 1997:181). This goes hand in hand 
with the notion of universalism in the sense that the purpose of progress aided by INGOs is 
for a common good. 
 
The four previous headlines merge into world citizenship. Even though individuals are 
different in their capabilities and have different resources, there is a strong sense of 
egalitarianism; all humans have the same basic rights, but also duties. Only fully democratic 
governance structures are consistent with world citizenship (Boli and Thomas, 1997). This 
despite the fact that some INGOs do not tolerate “autocratic” tendencies (The authors mention 
Greenpeace and the International Olympic Committee).  
 
4.2 Postinternationalism in a Turbulent World 
 
Another theory we intend to use is the theory on Postinternationalism in a Turbulent 
World by James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee. This theory is closely linked to the World 
Polity Theory, and is also used for the purpose of describing the new global governance system 
in which the role of actors have changed. But whereas the World Polity Theory mainly 
concerns itself with the role of the INGOs, the theory on Postinternationalism relates to the 
more general global system in which the actors are placed. Rosenau and Durfee describe what 
the reasons are for the change in this system. Another reason for implementing this theory is 
because it deals with the concept of legitimacy, and what the basis are for legitimacy in a 
turbulent global system.  
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This theory claims that “international” matters are no longer the dominant dimension of 
global life. Instead they argue that world politics have undergone a turbulent transformation, 
calling for a new “postinternational” paradigm (Rosenau and Durfee, 1995). The basis for the 
new paradigm is the huge changes within the global system. Changes of structures, processes 
and patterns, in which international affairs have been performed:  
 
 “It almost seems as if anomalous events – those developments that are unique and 
surprising because they deviate from history’s normal paths – have replaced recurrent 
patterns as the central tendencies in world politics.” (Rosenau and Durfee, 1995:32) 
 
Rosenau and Durfee describe The Turbulence Paradigm as the three parameters in 
which the huge changes have taken place. The overall structures of global politics are called 
the macro parameter. The authority structures that link macro collectivities to citizens are 
called the macro-micro parameter. Lastly, the skills of citizens are called the micro parameter.  
The table below shows the transformation.  
 
 From To 
Micro parameter Individuals less analytically 
skilful and emotionally 
competent 
Individuals more analytically 
skilful and emotionally 
competent 
Macro-micro parameter Authority structures in place 
as people rely on traditional 
and/or constitutional sources 
of legitimacy to comply with 
directives emanating from 
appropriate macro 
institutions   
Authority structures in crisis as 
people evolve performance 
criteria for legitimacy and 
compliance with the directives 
issued by macro officials    
Macro parameter Anarchic system of nation 
states 
Bifurcation of anarchic system 
into state- and multi-centric 
subsystems 
(Rosenau and Durfee, 1995:35) 
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The Micro Parameter: 
 
The first parameter is called A Skill Revolution and focuses on the individual citizen. 
The revolution relates to the change in the level of knowledge and skills of the citizens. This 
new knowledge is obtained through a variety of reasons “…ranging from the advance of 
communications technology to the greater intricacies of life in an ever more interdependent 
world…” (Rosenau and Durfee, 1995:35) 
  
The skill revolution has refined citizens on numerous levels, expanded the learning 
capacity, extended the detail and concepts of cognitive maps through which people perceive 
the world, and sophisticated the way they imagine and analyze how states, leaders and publics 
interact with each other. The most important result from this refinement is in accordance with 
Rosenau and Durfee the skill of participating in collective actions:  
 
 “Among the many skills that populations have refined, perhaps the most important is 
an enlarged capacity to know when and how to participate in collective action. It is no 
accident that the squares of the world cities have lately been filled with large crowds 
demanding change.” (Rosenau and Durfee, 1995:36) 
  
The last point in the micro parameter is the fact that the skill revolution is not equally 
spread throughout the world.  
 
The Macro-Micro Parameter: 
 
In the second parameter, turbulence has relocated authority. The parameter links the 
skill revolution of the micro parameter to the bifurcation of the macro parameter. The old 
authority structures, which are founded on traditional criteria of legitimacy, are replaced with 
authority structures based on performance criteria of legitimacy. Traditional criteria of 
legitimacy are framed by citizens complying with the directives issued by higher authority, 
because that was common practice (Rosenau and Durfee, 1995). The new Performance criteria 
of legitimacy are framed by citizens being much more aware of how the authority is 
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performing. This means that citizens now know that they have the choice of not complying 
when the performance of the authority is considered inappropriate. Performance is measured 
on needs, goals and stability. It of course also means that citizens comply when the 
performance is recorded as appropriate (Rosenau and Durfee, 1995). This authority crisis is a 
result of the skill revolution. The consequence of the relocation of authority is that states and 
governments have less power then before.  
 
The relocation of authority is moving both downwards and upwards. This means that 
the authority is moving in the direction of where the performance is considered appropriate by 
the citizens. Downward relocation of authority could be authority towards  
 
“…subnational groups local governments, single issue organizations, religious and 
linguistic groupings, political factions, trade unions and the like.” (Rosenau and Durfee, 
1995:39) 
 
Upward relocation of authority could be authority towards: 
 
“…supranational organizations like the European Union to intergovernmental organizations 
like the International Labor Organization, from nongovernmental organizations like 
Greenpeace to professional groups such as Medecins sans Frontiers…” (Rosenau, and Durfee, 
1995:39)               
 
The Macro Parameter: 
 
This last parameter focuses on a bifurcation of global structures. This parameter 
features the change in the overall structure of world politics. Rosenau and Durfee argue that the 
state centric world is accompanied by a complex multi-centric world. The state-centric world is 
defined by an anarchic system with sovereign nation states not having to answer to any higher 
authority and managing their conflicts through war. Hierarchy is based on military, economic 
and political power (Rosenau, and Durfee, 1995). 
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The complex multi-centric world is defined by a world of diverse actors with structures, 
processes and decision rules of its own. These actors are called the sovereignty-free actors 
(SFA) as opposed to the sovereign-bound actors (SBA) of the state-centric world. SFAs 
include multinational corporations, ethnic minorities, sub-national governments and 
bureaucracies, professional societies, political parties, trans-national organizations etc. 
(Rosenau and Durfee, 1995). 
 
The feature of the bifurcation of world politics is that the SBAs are now forced to cope 
with the SFAs, as the SBAs are no longer the only key actors:  
 
“They are faced with the new task of coping with disparate rivals from another world 
as well as the challenges posed by counterparts in their own world. The macro parameter is 
thus perhaps most incisively described as sustaining the two worlds of world politics.” 
(Rosenau and Durfee, 1995:42) 
 
4.3 The classical Weberian system of domination 
  
 Max Weber has contributed to a classical understanding of legitimacy as a sociological 
phenomenon, and he was concerned with a way of categorizing “systems of domination” in 
order to establish which kind of legitimacy or authority is at play in any given case (Heywood, 
2002). 
  
His aim was to create a simplified tool that could be used to recognize the different 
players on a political field. Weber divided authority in three different categories: 
 
Traditional authority inherits its legitimacy from long established traditions and 
customs. Traditional authority is legitimate “…because it has always existed” (Heywood, 
2002:211). The authoritative figure in this model does not need to renegotiate his legitimacy, it 
has been granted by earlier generations and their actions. Examples of traditional authority is 
found among patriarchal groups or clans, but also in some monarchies that still exists to this 
date, such as the Saudi royal family (Heywood. 2002). 
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Weber’s second form is the charismatic authority figure. Legitimacy is granted not by 
social status or position, but entirely by the common perception of his/her charisma. Often a 
“cult” like fascination with the ruler means that the governing system is impossible to maintain 
after the charismatic figure is gone. Examples of these are Napoleon, Hitler, and Mussolini 
(Heywood, 2002).  
 
 The third type of political legitimacy, the legal rational authority, “… links authority to 
a clearly and legally defined set of rules.” In this view, the legal-rational authority is the most 
common form of authority existing in modern states. The legitimacy in this case is granted by 
the way power is appointed by the masses, and then distributed among the elected. 
 
Since Weber developed his theories when the world looked much different than now, 
and when world governance was easier to define, his theory on authority and legitimacy is not 
exhaustive when applied to our project. It deals mostly with “the classical” modes of 
governance and his legal rational authority model can be viewed as a kind of ideal. It is 
obvious that the most desirable of the three – seen from a modern, Western perspective – is to 
be governed in the democracy which was still a young phenomenon at Weber’s time. Hence, 
Weber did not take into consideration TNCs and INGOs because they did not exercise 
significant influence at that time.   
 
For that reason we have chosen to use an additional theory to frame our discussion on 
legitimacy. 
 
4.4 Theory on the legitimacy of global governance institutions 
 
 We have decided to use the view and suggestions written by Allen Buchanan and 
Robert O. Keohane. In the article The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions they offer 
an explicit discussion on the criteria that should be applied, in order to assess the legitimacy of 
global governance institutions. Although the authors themselves do not necessarily claim their 
work to be a theory, but rather call it a “proposal for a public standard of legitimacy for global 
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governance institutions”, we have chosen to apply their views in our project as a theory. In the 
absence of thorough theories dealing with defining the legitimacy of global governance 
institutions, we consider Buchanan and Keohane’s principled proposal to be an appropriate 
system of standards in the contemporary world. Although it is not a theory just yet, we think 
that with improvements, it could have the status of a theory in the future. Nevertheless, it does 
satisfy our quest for standards on how to asses whether the Kimberley Process is legitimate. 
For simplicity, we will refer to their view as the Theory of Legitimacy of Global Governance 
Institutions, in the rest of the project. In the following section we will introduce the proposed 
standard shortly. 
  
Buchanan and Keohane propose that, for global governance institutions3 to be 
legitimate they have to possess certain values and meet certain standards of legitimacy, which 
they call the Complex Standard of Legitimacy. In the following we will introduce the aspects 
they consider to be crucial for global governance institutions to be legitimate. 
  
Buchanan and Keohane define the legitimacy of global governance institutions as 
follows: 
 
 ”Legitimacy in the case of global governance institutions, then, is the right to rule, 
understood to mean both that institutional agents are morally justified in making rules and 
attempting to secure compliance with them and that people subject to those rules have moral, 
content-independent reasons to follow them and/or to not interfere with others’ compliance 
with them.” (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006:411) 
 
  They propose that for an institution to be legitimate, it does not only have to satisfy the 
rational self-interests of its members, but must also posses some common moral standards that 
the members agree to pursue, even if they are not always beneficial for all the members. In 
addition, these standards do not necessarily have the highest moral level and they are not 
                                               
3 Buchanan and Keohane define global governance institutions, as institutions, that, just like governments, issue 
certain rules and have the authority to impose some kind of consequences, in the case of non compliance with 
them. The decisions usually need consent of the member states. Nevertheless, they do not claim authority to the 
use of violence, as the governments do (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006) 
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always fully just, but that does not mean that the institution should be automatically considered 
as illegitimate. This is because it is not only impossible for all to agree, what is just and what 
exactly this justice requires, but also because legitimacy is not the equivalent of justice, and it 
should not to be mistaken for it. 
 
 Buchanan and Keohane argue that the usually offered standards for legitimacy of global 
governance institutions: state consent, consent by democratic states and global democracy, are 
not sufficient in the present situation of the world. They claim that consent by states (meaning 
that global governance institutions are legitimate if, and only if, they are created through state 
consent) is not a sufficient criteria for legitimacy, because not all states are democratic, 
therefore there is really no legitimacy to transfer. If supposing that we would narrow it only to 
the consent of democratic states, it would still not be sufficient enough criteria. That is 
because, some of the democratic states are weaker in taking care of their citizens, and some are 
stronger, besides, the often existing tunnels of bureaucracy cannot ensure that all the decisions 
made are truly democratic. The last proposal, being that the global governance institutions have 
to be democratic themselves, is being rejected as well. This is so, as the situation in the world 
today, when looking at the nation-states, is not democratic at all, and because there is no global 
institution that could control if the standards of democracy are implemented. Many states are 
themselves undemocratic, lacking also other qualities for state legitimacy.  
 
 As we have explained the usually proposed standards, we will describe the Complex 
Standard of Legitimacy offered by Buchanan and Keohane. 
 
 Buchanan and Keohane offer following alternative standards for the legitimacy of 
institutions of global governance: 
 
1. “It must provide a reasonable public basis for coordinated support for the institutions 
in question, on the basis of moral reasons that are widely accessible in spite of the 
persistence of significant moral disagreement—in particular, about the requirements of 
justice.” (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006:417) There is a chance, that there are moral 
disagreements and uncertainty about the role of these global governance institutions in 
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the pursuit of global justice and about their overall goals, therefore for a global 
governance institution to be legitimate it has to find a way how to give answers for 
these questions. 
2. “It must not confuse legitimacy with justice but nonetheless must not allow that 
extremely unjust institutions are legitimate.” (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006:417) The 
criterion already mentioned in this chapter is emphasizing that it is not the main aim of 
these institutions to ensure global justice, however they are expected to meet at least 
minimum standards of justice. 
3. “It must take the ongoing consent of democratic states as a presumptive necessary 
condition, though not a sufficient condition, for legitimacy.” (Buchanan and Keohane, 
2006:417) 
4. “Although the standard should not make authorization by a global democracy a 
necessary condition of legitimacy, it should nonetheless promote the key values that 
underlie demands for democracy.” (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006:417 
5.  “It must properly reflect the dynamic character of global governance institutions: the 
fact that not only the means they employ, but even their goals, may and ought to change 
over time.” (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006:417) 
6. “It must address the two problems: the problem of bureaucratic discretion and the 
tendency of democratic states to disregard the legitimate interests of foreigners.” 
(Buchanan and Keohane, 2006:418) 
 
To give further insight on how Buchanan and Keohane suggest fulfilling these standards, we 
will give a short account of other necessary criteria for the global governance institutions to be 
legitimate. 
The main elements in this Complex standard of legitimacy are: 
- the institution must enjoy consent of democratic states 
- it must satisfy the criteria of minimal moral acceptability, comparative benefit and 
institutional integrity 
- they must possess the needed epistemic virtues 
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Discussing institutional qualities, Buchanan and Keohane propose three main points: 
- Minimal moral acceptability - these institutions have to respect at least the most basic 
human rights, and, though they do not have to do so to be legitimate, they are expected 
to promote the respect for human rights, as well as reach higher standards in human 
rights and justice.  
- Comparative benefit - the institution’s legitimacy can be questioned if there is an 
alternative institution which is able to fulfil the same goals better, as well as if it does 
not improve it’s practises, where it is obvious that it could. 
- Institutional integrity - for global governance institution to be legitimate, its practices 
have to respond the set goals. 
 
 Though it is important to mention, that Buchanan and Keohane consider these criteria 
as “counting principles” – meaning that there can be certain circumstances when one or two of 
them are not fulfilled and institution can still be considered legitimate. The more principles and 
the higher degree of them are satisfied, the higher the level of legitimacy in the institution. 
 
 To comply well with all these standards, according to Buchanan and Keohane, there is 
a need for an epistemic-deliberative quality of the institution, thus providing accountability and 
transparency, so it is possible to evaluate to what degree the institution really fulfils the 
standards.  
 
 Accountability must be not just taking place it must be the right kind of accountability. 
Thus, there must be standards to meet for those who are held accountable; information must be 
available to the accountability holders, and some kind of real action taken, if the standards are 
not met. Besides that, the institutions have to be able to continuously revise the existing 
standards and improve them. 
 
 Transparency must be provided for the global governance institutions to function in a 
way that they can be legitimate. Thus, the information about the work of an institution must be 
accessible for anyone, who would like to assess their work – for example for the NGOs. It also 
has to be accessible for a reasonable cost and in an understandable language. In Buchanan and 
  
Roskilde University  
The International Social Science Basic Studies, House 21.1, 3rd semester project - autumn 2007 
“Diamonds, Conflicts and Governance” 
Group 20: Maija Bertule, Jens M. Kring, Qillaq Nielsen, Lasse Degn, Hans Markus Borg Mogensen 
 
 
 38
Keohane’s opinion, if provided, such transparency can help to satisfy the minimal moral 
acceptability, comparative benefit and integrity criteria. 
 
 When talking about the availability of information, Buchanan and Keohane suggests 
that a legitimate global governing institution must possess three epistemic virtues: 
- They must produce reliable information 
- There must be at least narrow transparency, and it must provide that the information 
needed for the accountability holder is directed for them and that it is integrated and 
interpreted correctly 
- The institution must be capable of revising the terms of accountability and improving 
them 
 
 Buchanan and Keohane’s proposed standards of legitimacy and the Kimberley Process’ 
compliance with them will be discussed in more details in the analysis chapter of our project. 
 
4.5 Choice of theories 
 
The theories have, apart from helping us to gain knowledge and expand our perception, 
also made us approach the problematic in a broader analytical sense. The development from a 
relatively simple problematic to a more complex has been built up through our increased 
understanding of the problem area. As we have tried to uncover which mechanisms control the 
Kimberly Process, we have predominantly looked at theories that try to explain the power 
structures of global governance.   
 
The World Polity Theory introduces us to the initial structures, from which we 
conceptualize and establish the basic framework for our discussion. To elaborate on the general 
conceptions of the global political and economical power structures, we used theories with 
similar approaches to cover the views in more detail. The writings of Susan Strange 
considering Structural Changes and Postinternationalism in a Turbulent World by Rosenau and 
Durfee, furthermore increases the depth of our perception, in our attempt to uncover the 
economical/political factors within this problematic. The studying of these, help us to progress 
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on the analytical ladder. In this process we will incorporate Weber’s classical view on authority 
and legitimization and furthermore the works of Buchanan and Keohane, to move the analysis 
into a more modern and perhaps more relevant context. This theoretical framework will help us 
to move our focus from the instigation of the Kimberly Process, to an overall structural 
analysis of the global governance institutions, and to the discussion of the legitimacy of the 
Kimberley Process.  
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5 Analysis 
 
In this section we will give a brief account of the different steps in our analysis. 
 
Firstly we will discuss and describe the changes in society, during the most recent 
years, which have led to an increased focus, from the consumer, on moral and ethical issues.  
This is included due to ‘the enlightened consumer’ having a greater interest and saying 
in the world, and will be used to introduce the role that the aspects of transparency, ethics and 
accountability fulfil in relation to legitimacy. 
 
Secondly we will discuss the specific situation of the instigation of the Kimberley 
Process and the mixed actor involvement. To be able to discuss legitimacy in the Kimberley 
Process we must first discuss and describe the framework that legitimacy should be discussed 
in. This is prudent to include, as the world has changed and, as described earlier, new factors 
have entered the political arena of global governance, which need to be identified. 
  
Thirdly we will discuss whether the Kimberley Process has been successful.  
 
Fourthly we will discuss the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process as a global 
governance institution. This will be accomplished by analysing the legitimacy of the 
Kimberley Process in accordance with the criteria proposed by Buchanan and Keohane as 
well as the other theories introduced previously. 
 
 
 
5.1 Changes in society influencing the formation of the Kimberley Process 
 
In respect to the Kimberley Process, it is necessary to look at the reasons behind the 
establishment of the process, and here we are talking not only about the problems in the 
diamond market itself, but the emerging changes in the global society. The focus of this 
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chapter will be on the increase of the significance of ethical values in the global governance 
systems.  
 
The end of the cold war has been followed by the rise of the power of the “moral”. It 
has found its place not only in the relations between humans. Today, moralizing and the notion 
of the moral in the international economic relations, signifies a serious change in the capitalist 
world (Colonomos, 2005). The 1980s was the starting point of the internationalization of the 
markets, but it was followed not just by financial gains, it was also a reason for violations of 
human rights of many of the workers in places where multinationals were setting up their 
businesses.  As a consequence, in the 1990s the concept of corporate ethics emerged, 
advocated by different entrepreneurs devoted to ethical standards and values. For the first time 
the corporate ethics was not just something concerning the internal organization of the 
companies, it also took the relations between firms and their external environment into 
consideration (Colonomos, 2005). In particular, the embargo against South Africa and the 
boycott of the companies that traded with the apartheid regime was a landmark in the 
development of the moral consciousness (Colonomos, 2005).  
 
It is still increasingly evident in the modern business world that consumers pay 
attention to issues of ethics behind the products they purchase. The reason for that is not only 
the expansion of the modern technologies, which ensures fast flows of information across the 
borders, but it is also the rise of awareness between consumers, as well as the growing sense of 
responsibility between consumers. The issues of trust, transparency, ethics and sustainable 
development are becoming an inevitable part of the emerging global governance structures, 
with the Kimberley Process as just one of the examples. Zygmunt Bauman talks of our age as 
the ‘age of morality’ where globalization has made not only the level of risks in our lives rise, 
but also the global responsibility and level of reflection. Because of the fact that people are 
now more aware of a shared world and because of the blurring borders of the nation states, 
there is a need for new global governance systems (Power, 1997). 
 
The creation of the Kimberley Process was an unprecedented case, particularly because 
of its level of engagement from different actors, including civil society, governments and the 
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market players. This is a new form of global governance system, which results in rising 
significance of the INGOs and TNCs which have traditionally not been involved in the policy 
making. This will be emphasized in the next section on actors involved in the instigation of the 
Kimberley Process. 
 
When talking about the ‘age of morality’, the Kimberley Process follows the number of 
global initiatives dealing with ‘moral issues’. As the moral concerns take a stand in the minds 
of consumers, there is no way that changes can be avoided in the business environment. The 
case of the establishment of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme has shown that the 
big business companies are sensitive to the consumer preferences and ethical stands like never 
before.  Living in the age of information, the modern technologies and increasing information 
flows make it fast and easy for negative images to reach practically every part of the globe. 
This is a great risk, which companies are not willing to take, as that would almost certainly 
mean financial losses and bad public image. The policy of ‘naming and shaming’ is often an 
effective tool in the hands of the NGOs, as it can have serious economic consequences, not 
only damaging the reputation of the companies, but also depressing the share price and boycott 
of their products (Colonomos, 2005). Consumers are becoming more aware of the production 
locations, working conditions, and other parts of the production process, and there is an 
increasing demand for respecting the human rights standards and social justice, also in the 
outsourcing areas. Thereby, ethics has become one of the basic issues in the global business 
practices. The fight against child labor, animal testing and killing animals for fur are just few 
examples. Some of the most known examples of companies taking part in the local societies 
and contributing to the development are Body Shop, Starbucks and The Gap – these companies 
are engaging themselves in activities that are often considered a responsibility of the nation 
state government (such as ensuring environmentally safe products, engaging socially 
disadvantaged people in the work, as well as offering mutually beneficial terms for the small 
producers) (Garsten, 2003).  
 
Of course there is always a question, whether the real driving force behind these 
engagements is the concern for the local societies or the creation of a positive public image. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that costumers are more concerned with the way the 
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business is conducted, and these concerns are effectively advocated through different 
institutions and non-governmental institutions. As in the case of the Kimberley Process, the 
INGO Global Witness was the one to bring up the issue of the trade of conflict diamonds, and 
it was the launching of the public campaigns that played a crucial role in the restructuring of 
the diamond market.  
 
Meanwhile, the existing risk scenarios are also an opportunity for the companies to 
profit and gain an advantage in the market. Hence, those who are able to engage in these 
‘ethical’ activities are able not only to attract attention with their actions, but also to create a 
better public image in contrast to their maybe not so successful rivals (Garsten, 2003). 
 
“… the discourse on social accountability goes hand in hand with a perception of 
global risk scenarios and of new market opportunities in the positioning of the transnational 
corporation as a socially responsible actor – a ‘corporate citizen” (Garsten, 2003:359) 
 
Michael Power is in his book ‘The Audit Society’ talking about the changes that have 
been brought about by a greater need and request for accountability. Initiatives such as the 
Kimberley Process are not just requested to follow the ethical stands set, they are also held 
accountable for their work. Power talks about the emergence of the ‘audit society’ in Britain, 
but also in the rest of the developed world. Starting from the late 1980s and early 1990s, both 
individuals and organizations have experienced increased check up on what they actually do. 
And this is with reason, because, as Power says: “These accounts become objects of explicit 
checking in situations of doubt, conflict, mistrust and danger” (Power, 1997:1). This proved to 
be true in the case of the diamond market where the need for accountability from the market 
players rose, precisely because the wider public had doubts about their share of responsibility 
for the atrocities taking place in many places in Africa. Even though Power talks more about 
the concept of audit as a part of particularly the business world, meaning financial audits, he 
also considers the changes in society and its requirements as a whole. It is easy to draw 
parallels from a number of his claims to the particular case of the establishment of the 
Kimberley Process. For example in the case, when talking about the management practices: 
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“On this view audit is a form of checking which is demanded when agents expose 
principals to ‘moral hazards’, because they may act against the principals’ interests, and to 
‘information asymmetries’, because they know more than the principals. Audit is a risk 
reduction practice which benefits the principal because it inhibits the value reducing actions 
by agents”. (Power, 1997:5) 
 
Drawing parallels with the diamond market, and really any market, the situation is that 
the costumers, hence the buyers, are the real ‘principals’, as they have the final power to 
decide, whether the product will be bought or not. Even though actions such as the Kimberley 
Process do not reduce any kind of serious financial risk for the potential costumers, they do 
have the ability to impose certain ‘moral hazards’ on the buyers of the diamonds. It is clear, 
that many would-be-brides would not feel comfortable, or even would feel very concerned, 
knowing that diamonds they are wearing have the cost of an arm of a child in Africa. Society is 
changing, more and more awareness is rising in the developed world, about the consequences 
our actions have, not only within our closest circle of people, but also in other places in the 
world.  
 
Also, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is a system based on the principles 
of accountability and transparency, though it is arguable that these kinds of statements are 
often issued in order to convince the potential costumers, as well as human rights activists, 
about the legitimacy of the whole process.  
 
“Audit has become a benchmark for securing the legitimacy of organizational action in 
which auditable standards of performance have been created not merely to provide for 
substantive internal improvements to the quality of service, but to make these improvements 
externally verifiable via acts of certification.”  (Power, 1997:9-10) 
 
Still, as Power himself points out, these kind of public statements often contribute to 
the creation of a positive image. The audit techniques can be applied with different levels of 
genuineness. This genuineness is often left unquestioned, meaning that just stating the fact that 
audits are taking place, contributes to an uncritical production of assurance (Power, 1997).  
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The issues of accountability and ethics go hand in hand with a quest for more 
transparency in the market, also the diamond trade. The request for responsible practices is 
expected not only to take place, it is expected to provide a clear picture for the interested public 
of how, when, and where it is happening.   
 
Looking back again at the beginnings of the ethics emerging in the international 
business market and politics, the 1990s showed that transparency was one of the key objectives 
and ideals for those trying to design the structures of global governance. Until today it has 
become not only one of the characteristics of a trustworthy and democratic government work, 
but also a part of ethical business practices (Langley, 2001). Some difficulties of implementing 
transparency practices are posed by the fact that the concept of transparency has different 
meanings in different governance contexts, but several general definitions are proposed by 
Florini. He defines transparency as ‘self –disclosure’ and ‘regulation by revelation’ (Florini in 
Langley, 2001). The one of our particular interest, when discussing the Kimberley Process, 
would be the role of transparency as a leading value in creating global governance systems. In 
respect to the work of different institutions, including such establishments as the Kimberley 
Process, transparency is viewed as a new emerging principle of organization, constituting the 
concept of ‘institutional transparency’: 
 
“…mechanisms that facilitate the release of information about policies, capabilities, 
and preferences to outside parties” (Finel and Lord in Langley, 2001:75) 
 
To conclude, it is clear that ethical concerns have gained a staying position in the world 
politics, as well as the global market. We do owe a lot to NGOs such as Transparency 
International for the changes that have happened – thanks to them ‘transparency in the 
economic sphere corresponds to quality label that sanctions business responsibility’ 
(Colonomos, 2005). The demand for transparency, acknowledgment of basic human rights 
principles, and other ethical issues in the different governing institutions and actors in the 
world, played the main role in the quest for a scheme such as the Kimberley Process. 
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“In short, the world is embracing new standards of conduct, enforced not by 
surveillance and coercion but by willful disclosure.” (Florini in Langley, 2001:75) 
 
5.2 The mixed actor involvement in the instigation of the Kimberley Process 
 
In this section we will analyse the instigation of the Kimberley Process. The 
instigation process is interesting since it is an example of a process where nation states, IGOs 
(such as UN), INGOs (represented by Fatal Transactions), and private, trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) worked together to set up a scheme that could be used in order to reduce 
the trade in conflict diamonds. The conceptualised result – the Kimberley Process – is 
regarded as a success by the majority of parties involved in its formation, although they have 
different reasons for believing so, as well as different criteria for the achievement of success. 
Depending on which of the actors address the subject, the criteria ranges from eliminating 
conflict diamonds from the market, (DeBeers, 2007), reducing conflicts in Africa (UN, 2007), 
to ensuring human rights of the individuals in the (former) conflict areas (Fatal Transactions, 
2007). In this context it is interesting to note the language of the Kimberley Process itself, 
which states that the purpose of the Kimberley Process is “…to stem the flow of conflict 
diamonds.” (KPCS, 2007). 
 
As we try to understand the structures that exercise power globally, we must initially 
look to the sovereign states. Power, on an international level, was primarily, in traditional 
terms, enforced and defined through foreign policies and relations. These implementations of 
power were initiated to uphold sovereignty and to combat any foreign actors trying to invade 
or diminish the power of a country. As the world has lived through two world wars and a cold 
war standoff, the development of global politics has moved from a mere question of 
peace/war and sovereignty, to an integrate complexity of trade interests and “world 
community” exemplified by the creation of the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) 
and other inter-governmental organizations. Following this development certain changes have 
influenced the balance and structures of power. Sovereign nation-states have lost their 
monopoly to implement power globally, to actors such as trade and security unions, trans-
national companies and non-governmental organization. The growing complexity of interests 
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of both commercial and national, political agendas and alliances is at the foundation of this 
new balance of power. One of the reasons for these structural changes lays in the increased 
internationalization of individual nation’s affairs and interests. These common interests across 
national boundaries creates a system of networks which requires a new set of diplomacy, e.g. 
between state-firm (Strange, 1992) which enforces power through Multi-track Diplomacy and 
Mixed-actor Activism in a global governance between trans-national and national actors 
(Grant and Taylor. 2004). This point is also supported by Rosenau and Durfee who claims 
that sovereign-bound actors, in the form of sovereign states, is now forced to cope with 
sovereignty-free actors, in the form of e.g. trans-national organizations, in a complex multi-
centric world, which is defined by a world of diverse actors (Rosenau and Durfee, 1995).  
 
A prime example of this is the relationship between the government of Botswana, and 
DeBeers. Mutual interests in the extremely valuable diamond reserves in Botswana have 
created the biggest mining corporation in the world - Debswana - which we have previously 
described. This mutual or symbiotic relationship meant that a threat to the world diamond 
market would be a threat to both a nation state, as well as the TNC involved. 
 
A threat to the world diamond market was posed by INGOs in the late 1990’s. As we 
have described earlier, different INGOs formed an alliance in order to create awareness of the 
conflict diamond problematic. The events that unfolded in this process is a good example of 
how much power the INGOs can possess once they get the attention of world market 
consumers. Even though only a small number of the global population was actual members of 
the involved INGOs represented by Fatal Transactions, the way that the attention towards the 
conflict diamond subject suddenly was awoken, is a good example of the Turbulence 
Paradigm in function. If the Theory on Postinternationalism is applied, Rosenau and Durfee 
argue that the attention towards the conflict diamond is based on a restructuring of the Micro-
Macro Parameter. Legitimacy is now based on a Performance criterion which means that 
citizens are much more aware of how authority is performing. They have the choice of not 
complying when the performance of the authority is considered inappropriate. From being a 
subject that only a few people cared about, and that the industry could neglect, conflict 
diamonds created headlines and had to be taken seriously in order for the industry not to lose 
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recognition and thereby revenues. Due to the way that human rights groups, such as Fatal 
Transactions, are imbedded in the (western) world culture, the message sent out by these 
organizations had a readily acceptable focus: conflict diamonds cause violations of human 
rights. The widespread use of pictures of West African men, women, and children with 
amputated hand and arms, was on of the means to attract attention to the problem. An 
example of one of the photos brought in western media can be seen below:  
(Source: Mirror.co.uk, 2007) 
 
The INGOs involvement against conflict diamonds, and 
the way they could launch a successful campaign against the 
illegal trade, epitomizes Boli and Thomas’ world cultural 
principles which underlies the success of those INGOs. Due to the 
sense of the world citizenship that Boli and Thomas describe, 
ordinary people were empowered in order to act against atrocities 
committed far from their own back yard. Not by acting directly, 
but by putting pressure on the industry by changing consumer 
habits. And not only changing them directly, but merely suggesting that they were willing to 
change habits, if the industry did not actively make an attempt to combat the trade in conflict 
diamonds. The INGOs had been given a rational voluntaristic authority by the people due to 
the humane goal of their struggle.  
 
When we look at the balance of power at the global political scene, it is apparent that 
TNCs have become increasingly influential within the 20th century. There are several reasons 
for this development and as Susan Strange argues, the global market’s expansion, fuelled by 
the increased technological changes, mobile capital and trans boarder communications, can be 
explained by the structural changes that have occurred globally, predominantly within the last 
sixty years.   
 
“[…] most of the recent changes in world politics, however unrelated they may seem 
on the surface, can be traced back in large part to certain common roots in the global 
political economy. We see common driving forces of structural change behind the liberation 
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of Central Europe, the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the intractable payments 
deficit of the United States, the Japanese surpluses, the rapid rise of East Asian newly 
industrialized countries, and the U-turns of many developing country governments from 
military or authoritarian government to democracy, and from protection and import 
substitution towards open boarders and export promotions.” (Strange, 1992:158) 
 
These changes incorporate a world order that disperses the power between individual 
actors, which in effect constitutes a new balance of power.  
 
The individual actors, on the global political scene, are no longer confined to nation 
states only, but also to global and in principle “nation-less” state actors (Strange, 1992) such 
as TNCs. Rosenau and Durfee also support this argument in their explanation of the 
Turbulence Paradigm. 
   
As power more so is defined by a strong economy as opposed to military and 
territorial power alone, the importance of strong economic development and ability to 
compete on the global scene has become essential to nation-states.  
 
TNCs are, because of this development, exercising power, within the global political 
economy, at multiple levels. Companies are forced to “go global” and expand their markets in 
order to survive competition, and by doing so they exercise power by bringing technology and 
know-how to underdeveloped regions. As nation states are increasingly competing with each 
other to become more interesting for foreign investments and/or technological know-how and 
assistance, they give the initiative and “indirect” power to the TNCs. An example could be 
when local politicians agitate for lower corporate income taxes as an argument for bringing 
home investments. Another example is the case mentioned earlier, where the government of 
Namibia welcomed a diamond cutting- and polishing factory as it would create jobs and add 
value to the diamonds they export (Economist, 2004).  
 
As mentioned before, power through technology and know-how is one of the key 
factors for TNCs in their relation to individual nations/states. Natural resources are often 
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difficult and very expensive to extract and exploit and this is true especially to the poorer 
regions of the world. Africa is a prime example of this, with countless trans-national actors, 
both commercial and humanitarian, operating across the continent.  
 
The structural changes in the global political economy are in many ways epitomized 
by the development of the African continent. The power balance was defined initially by 
colonization, particularly by the British Empire, the French and the Dutch, and as these 
colonial empires disappeared, their legacy of power has remained. We see that powerful 
conglomerate companies, often based in these former colonial nations, still hold an almost 
monopolistic power across a wide range of commercial interests within the African Continent. 
As the development of Africa exemplifies the structural changes in the global political 
economy, the diamond industry and DeBeers epitomizes the shift of power from nation-state 
to global (mixed) actors.  DeBeers has exercised power by controlling the African diamond 
market within the last 100 years, but has recently ventured into new aspects within the 
structures of political economy. Conflict or blood diamonds have become a thorn in the side 
of the DeBeers Company and could pose serious problems for the Diamond industry. We 
argue that, as a response to the increased interest in conflict diamonds, from INGOs and the 
UN, DeBeers has been forced to take action, but at the same time been able to maintain its 
commercial advantage, by utilizing political and legislative measures, resulting in the 
collaboration of the Kimberly Process. 
 
“In early 2000, the De Beers/Diamond Trading Company (DTC) began to issue 
commercial guarantees that it would not buy or sell diamonds from conflict zones. It later 
issued a set of Best Practice Principles. These included a statement of professional and 
ethical standards that committed the company to preventing “the buying and trading of rough 
diamonds from areas where this would encourage or support conflict and human suffering,” 
[…] In 2000, the World Diamond Council published a website outlining its contributions to 
policy making, legislation, and public debate on conflict diamonds. The WDC has been an 
active in the Kimberley Process.” (Cook, 2003:10) 
 
By being active at the forefront, the DeBeers Company has taken on a role 
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traditionally filled by the INGOs, and by excelling at their game they have ensured their 
power status within the market. Whether these measures have effectively removed the 
problem of conflict diamonds or not, we elaborate on later, but it has none the less meant that 
the DeBeers Company and the diamond industry have consolidated their power and have at 
least on paper kept their integrity towards an increasing awareness and critical consumer 
community. 
 
Besides the TNC and INGO involvement in the instigation process of the Kimberley 
Process, IGOs were involved in the process of creating a certification scheme. The attention 
to the problem, however, was not fully awoken until Global Witness and other INGOs had 
been campaigning for some time (Grant and Taylor, 2004). Besides those campaigns, pressure 
from governments demanded steps to be taken by the UN. The government of Botswana 
needed to make a decoupling between diamond rings and amputated limbs in the minds of 
luxury item consumers all over the world, and was one of the strongest advocates for 
sanctions against the countries trading with conflict diamonds. Even though the amount of 
conflict diamonds in the world market was limited to estimates of 5-10 %, the revenue that 
could potentially be lost for Botswana was massive. If the industry as a whole (and especially 
if an African diamond producer) would be regarded as heartless and cruel, its reputation may 
have taken decades to restore. 
 
 The UN Security Council finally introduced sanctions in June 1998, forbidding 
countries to trade with UNITA diamonds from Angola. Besides these sanctions the UN 
worked along with INGOs to introduce a certification scheme that would assure that the 
origin of traded diamonds were not affiliated with conflicts and civil war. The effort resulted 
in the creation of the Kimberley Process (UN, 2007). 
 
5.3 Has the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme been successful?  
 
The Kimberley Process has been claimed to be a great success by the diamond industry 
as well as by most other participants. In the third year review of the Kimberley Process it has 
been admitted that the actual results of the certification scheme has exceeded the expectations. 
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The establishment of the Kimberley Process has made it more difficult for smugglers, rebels 
and others involved in the illicit trade of diamonds, to deliver diamonds for trade in the legal 
market. As the participants of the Kimberley Process are neither allowed to import or export 
diamonds to countries that are not a part of the certification scheme, more and more diamonds 
are streaming through monitored legal channels.  
 
In a relatively short time of 3 years the trade of illicit diamonds has reduced 
significantly, thanks to the level of cooperation and engagement of all the sectors. However, it 
is worth noticing that a considerable part of conflicts in Africa has ended as well, therefore it is 
difficult to prove the claim that the numbers of illicit diamond trade have reduced exclusively 
only because of the implementation of the Kimberley Process. What is important, is that while 
at the height of civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, DRC and Liberia (between the mid 1990s 
and beginning of 2000s) the percentage of conflict diamonds was thought to range between 4 
and 15 percent, now it is estimated to be less than one percent (KPCS Third Year Review, 
2006, and World Diamond Council, 2007). The improvement in the trade of legal diamonds is 
not deniable, regardless of the real reasons behind it. It is reported both by INGOs, as well as 
governments of the countries participating in the Kimberley Process. According to statistics on 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the value of official diamond exports rose from US$395 
million in 2002, to US$ 771 million in 2004, and to US$ 896 million in the first half of 2005 
alone (KPCS Third Year Review, 2006). The same tendencies are observable in other African 
countries that previously suffered from extensive trade in illicit diamonds. The review visit in 
Sierra Leone showed that around 80% of production is now controlled by the official system. 
The total value of exports increased from US$ 26 million in 2001, to US$ 155 million in 2004, 
and to US$ 142 million in 2005. This enables the government to invest more in spheres that are 
crucial for the development of the country (KPCS Third Year Review, 2006). Also in Angola 
the Kimberley Process statistics show that the value of diamonds exported was US$739 million 
in 2003, US$773 million in 2004, and has risen to US$1,089 million in 2005. 
 
The diamond trade partners are strongly interconnected and dependent on the changes 
taking place in the system, i.e. the exclusion of the Republic of Congo from the Kimberley 
Process in 2004 contributed directly to a dramatic increase in legal exports form DRC since 
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illegal routes were no longer available (KPCS Third Year Review, 2006). This plays an 
important role, as does the peer review system, which ensures that all the participants follow 
the requirements of the scheme. Nevertheless, it has its disadvantages too. 
 
The INGOs following the fight against illicit diamond trade still express concerns about 
the implementation’s success and sustainability. Main concerns by the civil society are 
questioning the effectiveness of self-regulation in the Kimberley Process. The system is based 
on a principle of self-regulation, but it has no clear measures and guidelines on how exactly to 
assure that diamonds are conflict-free and how to audit the system as a whole (Global Witness, 
2006). Even though most of the countries have passed some kind of regulations to support 
conflict-free diamonds, many of them have relatively weak government control measures; 
therefore, there is often no real guarantee that the diamonds on the market are actually conflict-
free (Global Witness, 2006). Also, the consequences for the countries not complying with the 
existing measures of the Kimberley Process are not clear. The technical document lacks more 
detailed rules concerning the procedures and timelines for entry, and expulsion and 
readmission due to non compliance (Wexler, 2006). As several cases of research show, many 
of the industry members have admitted that there is confusion about what some of the 
measures in the Kimberley Process actually mean in practice. Even though it is required for the 
participants to keep records of their issued certificates, procedures etc., there are no clear 
standards or guidelines as to how exactly that should be done (Global witness, 2006). As a 
result, the data collection, which was initially stressed to be an important part in the Kimberley 
Process, is uneven at its best, and so is the adoption and reinforcement of a number of 
measures in the process. 
 
Another major setback is the credibility of the certificates already issued and diamonds 
presented and sold as conflict-free. These diamonds might be granted a certificate to testify that 
they are conflict-free, but the lack of transparency in some countries makes it questionable. As 
for example governments in countries such as Russia, China, and Angola are reluctant to share 
information on their diamond resources. Facts concerning diamond mine locations, production 
statistics, as well as ownership of private shares in mining companies and tax collection 
procedures and figures are considered to be information of national security, and therefore not 
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handed out to public (Grant and Taylor, 2004). This poses serious obstacles in collecting 
precise information and keeping records of the progress made by the diamond industry. An 
example, which gives a clear picture of how the lack of transparency affects the credibility of 
the Kimberley Process, is Angola. The Angola Selling Corporation (Ascorp) was established in 
February 2000 and it is the official diamond buying enterprise in Angola. The government of 
Angola owns 51% of the company. The remaining 49% is held by diamond magnate Lev 
Leviev and Omega Diamonds. The main aim of creating Ascorp was originally to ensure that 
diamond trade is carried out systematically according to government’s regulations, thereby 
boosting the state revenue, as well as to prevent the diamonds mined by the UNITA rebels to 
be sold through official channels. However, with the corruption within the government and the 
lack of credible verification procedures and data, some of the conflict diamonds can be 
certified as conflict-free and reach the market. This is a typical situation also in a number of 
other diamond-mining countries, especially those with alluvial mining (Grant and Taylor, 
2004). A recent example was the conflict diamonds from Cote d’Ivoire entering the legitimate 
market. Diamonds in this case are often entering legal trade through Mali or Ghana, where they 
are certified as conflict-free and from there sold on. A similar situation has also been 
discovered in Sierra Leone. Findings by a peer review visit in Sierra Leone in 2005 estimated 
that around 20% of diamond production was smuggled to the legal market through 
neighbouring countries (Global Witness, 2006). 
 
 In the KPCS Third Year Review Cote d’Ivoire has expressed dissatisfaction with the 
Kimberley Process due to the fact that these conflict diamonds reached the market, however no 
sanctions were imposed on those involved in the trade. This is not an uncommon situation in 
the diamond market. Often the illegal diamond traders are known by members of the industry, 
but they hesitate to take action, thereby living up to the promises of the Kimberley Process, and 
the governments of the countries fail to keep industry accountable. If the Kimberly Process is 
to maintain its legitimacy, it will be an important task to improve the existing regulations and 
include the lessons learned, integrating them in actual policies and guidelines for its members. 
Even though most of official information by the diamond industry is extremely optimistic 
about the results achieved by the Kimberley Process, it is clear that it has a great number of 
points to improve. The industry though, is trying to cover up for that, by spreading effective 
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and over-optimistic public relation campaigns. The Kimberley Process has definitely been 
successful, just by bringing the problem of conflict diamonds in light; nevertheless, it has to be 
improved, before it can work as a legitimate, sustainable and credible institution in global 
governance. 
 
5.4 Legitimacy of Kimberley Process as an institution in global governance 
 
In this section we will discuss, whether the Kimberley Process can be considered to be 
legitimate, according to the Complex Standard of Legitimacy proposed by Buchanan and 
Keohane. We will also consider the legitimacy of the Kimberley process in the framework of 
Weber’s legitimacy theory, World Polity theory and the theory of Postinternationalism in a 
Turbulent World.  
 
The question of legitimacy has been debated increasingly, due to the changing structure 
of the international political systems. If decades ago the concept of legitimacy was mainly 
limited to the legitimacy of governments of nation states, then, with new forms of global 
governance and new types of actors on the international political scene emerging, now it is 
necessary to find new ways of how to define the legitimacy of these structures. The Kimberley 
Process is also a new form of international political and governing structure, which makes it 
especially important to define the legitimacy, both of this particular scheme, and of similar 
kind of formations which are very likely to be established in the future. In this part of the 
analysis we would like to discuss those characteristics and norms, which define its legitimacy, 
as well as use the chosen theories to assess the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process. We will 
apply the World Polity theory and the theory on Postinternationalism in a Turbulent World and 
put emphasis on the two theories on legitimacy, Complex Standard of Legitimacy and Weber’s 
theory on legitimacy.  
 
Legitimacy has a number of different definitions, ranging from very limited ones, 
concerning governments, to more broad ones, also defining other cases, where the right to rule 
is discussed. We have found the quote below appropriate for our discussion: 
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“The term legitimacy (from the Latin legitimare, meaning ‘to declare lawful’) broadly 
means rightfulness. Legitimacy therefore confers on an order or command an authoritative or 
binding character, thus transforming power into authority. (..) Political philosophers treat 
legitimacy as a moral or rational principle, the grounds on which governments may demand 
obedience from citizens. The claim to legitimacy is thus more important than the fact of 
obedience. Political scientists, however, usually see legitimacy in sociological terms: that is as 
a willingness to comply with a system of rule regardless of how this is achieved.” (Heywood, 
2002:210) 
 
First of all it is necessary to place the Kimberley Process in the framework of the 
Complex Standard of Legitimacy, by arguing that it exercises its power in an environment of 
global governance, and that it is an institution in this environment. As we have described 
earlier, common interests across national boundaries are creating a system of networks. These 
networks require a new form of diplomacy, e.g. between states and firms, which enforces 
power through Multi-track Diplomacy, and Mixed-actor Activism in a global governance 
between trans-national companies and national actors (Strange, 1992, Grant and Taylor, 2004). 
In this context the Kimberley Process is a result of the common interest, namely to prevent the 
trade in conflict diamonds. The Kimberley Process is also enforcing its power through Multi-
track Diplomacy and Mixed-actor Activism as the involved actors are states, TNCs and 
INGOs. When we consider the Kimberley Process as an institution it is based on Buchanan and 
Keohane’s description of what constitutes a global governance institution.  
 
 “These institutions are like governments in that they issue rules and publicly attach 
significant consequences to compliance or failure to comply with them — and claim the 
authority to do so.” (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006:406).  
 
 This fits with the Kimberley Process, as the scheme is issuing a set of rules that the 
members are expected to comply with and which result in different legislations concerning 
diamond trade. Following this, the scheme reserves its right to exclude members if they trade 
in conflict diamonds. The consequence should supposedly be that the violators are unable to 
trade diamonds with members of the scheme: “Each participant should ensure that no 
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shipment of rough diamonds is imported from or exported to a non-Participant.” (KPCS, 
2007:6). Considering the number of the member states of the Kimberley Process, it is indeed 
a significant consequence, because the major market players in the diamond trade are the 
participants. Losing them as trade partners would be devastating to any diamond business. 
 
Another point by Buchanan and Keohane is that the global governance institutions: 
 
  “…do not attempt to perform anything approaching a full range of governmental 
functions. These institutions do not seek, as governments do, to monopolize the legitimate use 
of violence within a permanently specified territory, and their design and major actions 
require the consent of states.” (Buchanan and Keohane, 2006:406).  
 
 This description also corresponds with the Kimberley Process as it can only be: 
“modified by consensus of the Participants.” (KPCS, 2007:11) 
 
As the Kimberley Process is now in the framework of Buchanan and Keohane’s theory, 
and we have proved that it is a global governance institution, we will now discuss its 
legitimacy according to the theories. 
 
To start with, we must recall Weber’s classical view on legitimacy and his proposed 
three ideal types of ‘systems of domination’. In the framework of the critical realism, we 
acknowledge that the world and reality is continuously changing. The World Polity theory 
showed the emerging power of the INGOs, while Weber’s view is not considering these kinds 
of formations, simply because INGOs as a political power are a new phenomenon. Also the 
theory of Postinternationalism in a turbulent world explains the changes that have taken place, 
which were hardly even imaginable at the time of Weber. 
 
The reality in the time when Weber proposed his three sources of authority was 
different from the reality today; therefore it is not possible to fully apply his theory. His first 
two forms of authority are difficult to apply to a global governance institution such as the 
Kimberley Process. It is definitely not a traditional authority, because, as we have discussed 
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earlier, it is a new kind of formation. This was proved by the theory of Postinternationalism in 
a Turbulent World. One of the changes described, was the change in citizen’s minds, meaning 
that they are no longer just complying with the traditional rules. The governance institutions 
are challenged if there are any doubts about their appropriateness. Compliance with rules is 
taking place when it is seen as appropriate, not only because it is socially expected to do so, 
and because it is common practice.  The second type of authority, namely the charismatic 
authority, is also difficult to be seen as a source for legitimacy of global governance 
institutions. This is so because of the quest for consensus and democratic decision taking in the 
practises of the global governance institutions. This is difficult to be imagined in a case of 
charismatic authority, best exemplified in history by Hitler and Napoleon. Finally, Weber’s 
third type of political legitimacy, the legal-rational authority, is one that he saw operating in the 
most modern states. It is to some extent possible to see this authority as the source of 
legitimacy in the case of the Kimberley Process, as it is based on a clearly and legally defined 
set of rules. Besides, the UN mandate to the Kimberley Process also backs its legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to readily accept this, as the only defining criterion for the 
legitimacy of the Kimberley Process, because the reasons behind its initial establishment are 
more complex than so. Also, the Kimberley Process, at the moment, cannot be seen as a clearly 
and legally defined set of rules, because of the reasons mentioned earlier in the project.  
 
Even though we see some useful points in Weber’s theory, we consider Buchanan and 
Keohane’s theory on legitimacy more contemporary, and to cover a wider range of criteria 
needed for global governance institution to be legitimate.  
 
We will start by discussing the three main elements in the Complex Standard of 
legitimacy. Firstly we will discuss the consensus criterion, and whether the Kimberley Process 
enjoys consensus of democratic states. Secondly we will discuss the criteria of minimal moral 
acceptability, comparative benefit and institutional integrity, and whether the Kimberley 
Process lives up to those. The last point will be a discussion on the possession of epistemic 
virtues within the Kimberley Process.  
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When assessing the criteria of consensus of democratic states, we have to bear in mind 
the fact that the members are not only state actors. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the 
majority of the actors are states, we argue that it is possible to discuss legitimacy on the basis 
of this criterion. In the case of the Kimberley Process all the decisions are made on a basis of 
consensus between the actors, therefore a major problem lies in the fact, that many of the 
members, especially a number of the diamond producing countries in Africa are not true 
democratic states in a Western perspective. They might be officially labelled as democracies, 
but the continuous abuse of human rights, which was one of the very reasons for the 
implementation, as well as state-legitimacy undermining issues such as corruption, does not 
endorse the notion of them being actual democracies. Despite of this, all members of the 
Kimberley process are still requested to play by the rules of the scheme. A great number of the 
scheme members are democratic states, including the biggest market players such as the US 
and Canada, which have great influence on the formulation of the scheme. Therefore, at least 
to some extent, this criterion can be seen as fulfilled. 
 
Furthermore, we would like to discuss the three institutional qualities of the global 
governance institutions. The first is the criterion of minimal moral acceptability. The very 
reason for the establishment of the Kimberley Process was the concern about the violations of 
basic human rights. The atrocities taking place in Africa have ended in many places, largely 
due to the fact that the civil wars have ceased.  It is also evident that most of society supports 
ending the trade in conflict diamonds, since most of the world has ratified the Kimberley 
Process. It is unquestionable, that the global society was shocked and disapproved of the dark 
sides of the diamond trade that were brought to light. The Kimberley Process does contribute 
to promoting basic human rights, but one of the concerns is whether it is doing enough. Even 
though people are presumably not in such a physical danger anymore, as they were during the 
civil wars and when the trade with conflict diamonds was taking place, the question is if the 
Kimberley Process has too narrow goals, just settling with a very economic approach to the 
trade of conflict diamonds. The main question figuring is only about the legal and illegal 
market of the diamonds. Not much is discussed about the people behind the processes. It is 
known that many of the mine workers, especially those working in the alluvial mining sector, 
are experiencing bad working conditions and low salaries. The diamond industry includes as 
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many as 10 million people that are directly or indirectly supported by it, with over a million 
people employed in the diamond industry in India alone (World Diamond Council, 2007). But 
so far it does not seem that the members of the Kimberley Process are intending to take a step 
further and express interest in taking care of the other human rights issues in the industry. The 
setting of the goals seems to have stopped at the point of ensuring that the diamonds on the 
market come from conflict free areas. This is the question that can seriously undermine the 
legitimacy of the Kimberley Process. Once the civil conflicts in Africa ended, following the 
definition, none of the diamonds coming from those areas can be classified as conflict-
diamonds. Thus, if one day all the diamond mining areas would live in peace, what would 
happen to the Kimberley Process – would it lose its point of existence? 
 
What concerns the issue of comparative benefit, it is quite clear that the Kimberley 
Process is, at the moment, the only global governance institution that can deal with the 
problems with the trade of conflict diamonds in such detail and scale. There are several 
institutions such as the World Diamond Council and Council for Responsible Jewellery 
Practices, which deal with issues like the illegal diamond trade, but so far the Kimberley 
Process seems to be the most effective one, considering the scale and power of imposing 
various legislations on the countries. Of course, the Kimberley Process does have a number of 
flaws, but the information that is presented in the KPCS Third Year Review as well as the 
different information in the media, points that the many areas where these problems persist is 
being discussed, and the participation of the civil society has provided a number of 
recommendations, that hopefully will be taken into serious consideration. Thus, our concern is 
that all the actions of the members are voluntary. This can be a major drawback that might 
considerably slow down the implementation processes of the improvements. Without real 
serious consequences, the members are not always being active in implementing effective 
regulations. This can be seen in the differences between member states – some of the members 
only have a very few effective policies to ensure that the diamonds reaching the market are 
conflict free, while others have implemented much more thorough regulations. 
 
Looking at the institutional integrity of the Kimberley Process, we can say that in 
overall, the practices carried out by the members do respond the set goals. All the steps taken, 
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in one way or the other, are intended to improve the trade of legal diamonds and prevent the 
trade of the illicit ones. Though, it owes a lot to the INGOs that follow the certification 
processes and continuously come up with criticisms and proposals for improving the scheme. 
A concern is that it could do better, if the main legislations would not be based on voluntary 
action. There are areas that could definitely be improved, incorporating the criticisms and 
suggestions made by the civil society. With this the members of the Kimberley Process could 
not only fulfil the existing requirements, but show real commitment to reaching the set goals. 
 
Buchanan and Keohane name accountability and transparency as epistemic-deliberative 
quality criteria in order for the institution to be legitimate. The Kimberley Process puts a lot of 
emphasis on the accountability and transparency provision in the trade activities. As the KPCS 
Third Year Review states, a number of the process members have a self regulation system that 
is an object to regular audits. An example is the European Commission (EC), which classifies 
as a single member:  
 
“The EC has an extensive system of industry self-regulation in place based on industry 
self regulating bodies that have been recognized by the EC authorities. The system is based on 
regular audits by independent auditors of members of each self-regulating body, and operates 
under the ultimate responsibility of the public authorities.” (KPCS Third Year Review, 
2006:57) 
 
But in reality, only a few of them are actually engaged in these kinds of accountability 
insurance practices. As a matter of fact, it is only the EC, so far, which is carrying out audit 
procedures. Botswana, mentioned in the KPCS Third Year Review as another good practice 
example, is not ensuring independent audits itself, but instead collects a variety of data from 
the diamond market, which then can be used by the auditors.  
 
The Kimberley Process is putting a great emphasis on providing the transparency of the 
work done within the framework of the scheme. For example, publication of the data gathered 
by the review visits is mentioned as one of the main goals in order to improve the overall 
transparency of the scheme (KPCS Third Year Review, 2006). However, one of the main 
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challenges posed for the Kimberley Process is the ability to divide which data are to be opened 
to the wider public, and which data are to be kept confidential in order to protect businesses 
and governments, concerning competition and national security: 
 
“The Kimberley Process strives to be transparent. However, it is concerned with 
balancing transparency and necessary confidentiality, as in the case, for example, of security 
requirements when dealing with politically sensitive and/or commercially valuable information 
relating to the trade in rough diamonds, or information that is sub-judice. In its outreach to the 
public, the KP’s principal communication tool is its general KP website, where it seeks to 
balance these concerns.” (KPCS Third Year Review, 2006:70) 
 
Discussing the three epistemic values of the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process, we 
can say that, in the process of making the project, we experienced ourselves that the official 
website does provide some information about the different actions taken, as well as changes in 
the process. Nevertheless, the data tables available proved to be quite poor, even though the 
data collection is especially stressed as relevant both in the initial Kimberley Process 
document, as well as in the third year review. The official website offers a long list of different 
review visit documents, but the section of statistics is providing only a few charts and tables. A 
positive point is that the documents, from review visits and the member meetings, are all 
available for public. There is also a reasonable credibility to these documents, as many of the 
review visits are made in cooperation with the INGOs, not only the industry members. Also the 
third year review was a positive initiative from the members of the Kimberley Process; 
however, it could have provided more thorough information, especially regarding the statistics. 
   
The Kimberley Process is in a continuous process of revision by the different INGOs 
that follow the work of the scheme. A number of suggestions and papers have been produced, 
and the Kimberley Process members are discussing the possibilities of improving the scheme. 
If these discussions will really end up in revising and changing the structures, such as 
improvements of government control mechanisms, then it is reasonable to believe that the 
Kimberley Process has the dynamic character needed for a global governance institution to 
develop in time, and even revise the goals, paying attention to other human rights issues in the 
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diamond trade, as there is more to be fixed in the diamond trade industry than just eliminating 
the illicit diamond trade. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The research process revealed the changes that have taken place in society within the 
last decades. We found it important for the discussion of the Kimberley Process that major 
structures in society have changed. The reasons behind the instigation of the Kimberley 
Process, as we discovered, can not only be narrowed down to the trade of conflict diamonds. 
To see other reasons behind it, we have discussed the emergence of ethics and moral issues 
and the influence of the ‘moral’ in contemporary society. We conducted our research in the 
framework of critical realism; therefore it was especially important to consider these major 
changes in people’s conscience in order to understand the reasons for the creation of the 
Kimberley Process. We acknowledge that these changes are impossible to observe in a direct 
way, but we also acknowledge that it is the very idea of critical realism, that: 
 
 “(…) we will only be able to understand – and so change - the social world if we 
identify the structures at work that generate those events and discourses.” (Bhaskar in 
Bryman, 2004:12) 
  
 Therefore, instead of analyzing only the Kimberley Process itself, we discussed the 
mechanisms in society. Having recognized the shift in people’s minds, we also researched the 
governance structures and actors. 
 
We argue that the mechanisms behind the Kimberley Process are a result of new 
global governance. New in the sense that the traditional power holding institutions, are no 
longer confined to sovereign nation-states. Global actors, within the political arena with 
respective economical and social agendas, have been forced to merge, in the new setting of 
the global governance system. This we see in the creation of the Kimberley Process, which is 
a result of cooperation between sovereign states, civil society actors, such as INGOs, and 
market players, such as DeBeers. In the creation process, the INGOs acted as a global 
governance factor and exercised power over the diamond industry in a way, which forced the 
industry to redefine their ways of conducting business. However, as the Kimberley process 
was implemented, and especially as the conflicts with their graphic atrocities ended, the 
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significance of the INGOs as a power factor in the global governance system has been 
diminished. Now, the diamond industry is left with a certification scheme which can be 
utilised in strengthening their image as a politically correct actor.    
 
As an attempt to improve the situation in the diamond trade, whatever the real reasons 
behind it, the Kimberley Process is certainly worth supporting. Even if the percentage of illicit 
and legal trade presented by the diamond industry is not accurate to detail, it is clear that 
illegal diamond trade has diminished. This can be seen in the increased amount of legal 
exports in the diamond producing countries. It is not likely that the mining output has really 
increased so considerably since the implementation of the scheme, therefore, we can conclude 
that the reason behind the increased exports through government channels, are at least to some 
extent, a result of more diamonds streaming through official channels, instead of being traded 
on the black market. 
 
We have discussed the legitimacy of the scheme according to the legitimacy theories. 
Based on our analysis, we can conclude that the Kimberley Process does fulfill the criteria for 
legitimacy, at least for the time being. This is so, because, even with considerable 
imperfections, the KPCS is for now the only global governance institution that is able to 
exercise such influence over diamond market players and structures. In addition to that, it 
certainly fulfils the criterion for minimal moral acceptability. There is an ongoing support to 
the moral values of the scheme, namely that it is not morally right for companies to trade with 
conflict diamonds. Also, the scheme acknowledges the importance of transparency and 
accountability in its work. Regarding the state consent, we have discussed the scheme’s flaws 
in more detail, and it is possible to conclude that it does, even though not to the full extent, 
fulfill this criterion as well. The proof of this can bee seen in the Kimberley Process Third 
Year review, where most of the countries admit that the scheme has been successful and 
improves the general situation. There were no major arguments about the principles of the 
schemes except for one country, arguing that the measures against countries not complying 
with the rules are not strict enough.  
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As a global governance institution, the Kimberley Process has shown its dynamic 
character not only in the rapid establishment of the scheme, but also in the ongoing discussion 
with civil society. Many of the recommendations have been taken into consideration and 
brought into discussion. 
 
Despite all this, there still persists a question of the legitimacy of the Kimberley 
Process. For now the scheme, even though not strongly, maintains its legitimacy both because 
of the lack of alternative institutions, the wide support from the global society and its success. 
However, the question we have already brought up is of its future and of the formulation of 
the scheme. For now, the aims of the scheme are too narrow for it to maintain its legitimacy in 
the future. If the conflicts in the diamond mining regions cease, the scheme will lose its 
importance and sustainability. Also the criterion for minimal moral acceptability, which the 
scheme maintains to an acceptable degree so far, has to be revised in future. As we have 
discussed in our analysis part, the working conditions in the diamond mining sector are often 
unacceptable, especially considering alluvial mining, and we suggest that the diamond 
industry should also take a share of responsibility of the violations of human rights among 
miners. 
 
An important fact to consider, when assessing the legitimacy of the scheme, is the fact 
that the scheme is relatively new. Established in only three years, it is still changing and 
trying to improve the flaws that are found in its practices. If the diamond industry and the 
governments are really determined to solve the problems in the diamond industry, will be 
seen with time. Civil society representatives have proposed a number of suggestions on how 
to improve the scheme. Applying them in practice would considerably raise the scheme’s 
level of legitimacy in the contemporary world of emerging global governance institutions. It 
will be crucial for the scheme’s legitimacy in long term whether the diamond industry will 
incorporate these suggestions.  
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8 Appendices 
 
8.1 The timeline of the KPCS4 
 
1998 
June 24, 1998 - The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution, which 
prohibited, among other measures, the direct or indirect export of unofficial Angolan 
diamonds (those not accompanied by a Certificate of Origin issued by the Angolan 
Government). The Angolans showed no co-operation & as a result sanctions came into force 
on 1 July, 1998. 
 
1999 
October 3, 1999 - Global Witness led a group of four European NGOs in a new initiative 
called ‘Fatal Transactions’. The group comprised Global Witness (UK), Medico International 
(Germany), Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa (Netherlands) & Novib (part of 
OXFAM). The coalition published a press release entitled ‘Campaign launched to stop billion 
dollar diamond trade from funding conflict in Africa’. It was accompanied by a PR campaign 
aimed at selected journalists & jewelry retailers that used mock diamond rings in jewelry 
boxes with labels attached giving negative statistics about the diamond industry’s impact on 
the prospects of peace in Angola. 
 
2000 
May 11-12, 2000 –- A forum was held in Kimberley to discuss the issues surrounding conflict 
diamonds. This meeting signified the start of the Kimberley Process (KP). 
 
July 5, 2000 - The UN Security Council voted to impose a world-wide ban on the purchase of 
rough diamonds from Sierra Leone. 
 
July 2000 - The World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International Diamond 
Manufacturers Association met in Antwerp and passed a resolution creating the World 
Diamond Council (WDC). The resolution called for the not-for-profit WDC to develop and 
implement a tracking system for the export and import of rough diamonds to prevent the 
exploitation of diamonds for illegal purposes. 
 
September 4-5, 2000 - A meeting of over 50 delegates from all the main diamond producing 
& importing countries, except Sierra Leone, DRC & India, was hosted by Namibia’s Ministry 
of Mines & Energy. The aim of the two days was to complete the drafting of a document 
outlining the working group’s proposals & also to draft a statement for publication by 
Ministers, both for ratification at a Ministerial meeting to be held in Pretoria on 21st 
September. 
 
September 7, 2000 - The inaugural meeting of the World Diamond Council is held in Tel 
Aviv, where it is agreed that the Council be mandated to develop further & implement a 
                                               
4 Taken from the World Diamond Council website www.diamondfacts.org 
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comprehensive plan to curtail the trade in conflict diamonds while minimizing impact on the 
legitimate diamond trade. 
 
September 19-21, 2000 - Governments, industry and NGOs finalized a document to be put 
forward at a forthcoming London Conference in preparation of a UN General Assembly 
Resolution (UNGAR) concerning ending the trade in conflict diamonds 
 
October 25-26, 2000 – An Intergovernmental Conference held in London (chaired by the UK 
Government) established a working document to be put forward for discussion at the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 
 
December 1, 2000 - The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a draft resolution 
on conflict diamonds, which became the framework for the introduction of a global 
certification system and for nations to devise and implement national legislation regarding 
diamond trading activities. 
 
2001 
February 13-16, 2001 - The first time the term ‘Kimberley Process’ was officially used. A 
meeting of the 38 governments of countries involved in the Kimberley Process took place in 
Windhoek, Namibia. 
 
February 20, 2001 - The Israeli diamond banks issued a notice to their clients warning them 
of the conflict diamond issue, urging them to comply with UN resolutions. They advised their 
clients not to deal in conflict goods. 
 
April 25-27, 2001 - The Kimberley Process inter-governmental group met in Brussels, 
Belgium to further the process of the global certification system. 
 
May 7, 2001 - UN Security Council Resolution 1343 re Liberia automatically took effect in 
the absence of evidence that Monrovia had stopped supporting armed groups in the region, in 
particular the RUF in Sierra Leone. The resolution included the banning of diamond exports 
from Liberia until proof was shown that a certification scheme had been introduced. 
 
July 3-4, 2001 - The Kimberley Process participants met in Plenary Session in Moscow. The 
main objective of the meeting was to define minimum acceptable standards for an 
international system of certification of rough diamonds, consistent with the mandate set out in 
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution. 
 
September 11-13, 2001 - The Kimberley Process participants met in Plenary Session in the 
UK. 
 
October 30 - November 1, 2001 - The participants in the Kimberley Process met in Plenary 
Session in Luanda, Angola. 
 
November 26-28, 2001 - The Kimberley Process met in Gaborone, Botswana and agreed the 
minimum standards for a global certification system. 
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2002 
March 13, 2002 – The WDC formally adopted the System of Warranties in Milan. Under this 
system, which has been endorsed by all Kimberley Process participants, all buyers and sellers 
of both rough and polished diamonds must make the following affirmative statement on all 
invoices: "The diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources not 
involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations Resolutions. The 
undersigned hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict free, based on personal 
knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these diamonds." 
 
March 18-20, 2002 - Kimberley Process meeting took place in Canada. 
 
July 18, 2002. The European Commission released a 1st draft of a ‘Council Regulation – 
Implementing the Kimberley Process Certification System for the International trade in rough 
diamonds’. 
 
November 4-5, 2002 - Kimberley Process meeting took place in Interlaken, Switzerland. 37 
nations signed the Kimberley Process Certification System whereby rough diamonds will be 
accompanied by a certificate on import and export. Rough diamonds will not be exported to 
countries who are not participants of the System. The System was to be implemented on 
January 1, 2003. Many participant countries were ill prepared to fully implement the Process, 
including the US and UK. A ‘grace’ period was issued until May 1, 2003. 
 
2003 
January 1, 2003 – South Africa is appointed Chair of the Kimberley Process. 
 
February 13, 2003 -The UK Government Diamond Office (UKGDO) was formally opened. 
 
April 24, 2003 - US President Bush signed and made law HR 1584 the ‘Clean Diamonds 
Trade Act’ implementing regulations that make the US Kimberley Process compliant. 
 
April 30, 2003 - The Kimberley Process convened for a plenary meeting in Johannesburg. 
The full implementation of the Kimberley Process was extended until 31st July 2003 for new 
participants. Those countries already accepted as participants were required to be fully legally 
compliant by May 1, 2003. 
 
May 1, 2003 - The Kimberley Process was fully implemented in all participant countries. 
Only participant countries are now allowed to trade in rough diamonds with each other. New 
applicants for participation are given until July 31 to implement national legislation. 
 
June 4, 2003 - The United Nations Security Council lifted the regulation regarding the export 
of diamonds from Sierra Leone. 
 
October 20, 2003 - Kimberley Process Plenary meeting in Sun City, South Africa, where the 
main topic was establishing the criteria for monitoring the Kimberley Process. 
 
  
Roskilde University  
The International Social Science Basic Studies, House 21.1, 3rd semester project - autumn 2007 
“Diamonds, Conflicts and Governance” 
Group 20: Maija Bertule, Jens M. Kring, Qillaq Nielsen, Lasse Degn, Hans Markus Borg Mogensen 
 
 
 74
2004 
January 1, 2004 – Canada appointed Chair of Kimberley Process. 
 
July 9, 2004 – The Republic of Congo (also known as Congo Brazzaville) is removed from 
the Kimberley Process following a review mission. “The Republic of Congo cannot account 
for the origin of large quantities of rough diamonds that it is officially exporting”, said Tim 
Martin, Canadian Chairman of the Kimberley Process. “Kimberley Process Participants 
needed to have complete confidence that conflict diamonds are not entering the legitimate 
trade. The removal of the Republic of Congo from the list of participants is necessary to 
safeguard the credibility and integrity of the Kimberley Process Certificate System.” 
 
October 29, 2004 – The participants of the Kimberley Process met in Plenary in Gatineau, 
Quebec. President Tim Martin announced in his closing speech and Chairman’s report that the 
Kimberley Process – which certifies that diamonds are from areas free of conflict – covers 
99.8% of all diamonds traded globally. 
 
2005 
January 1, 2005 – Russia appointed Kimberley Process Chair 
 
November 17-18, 2005 – Kimberley Process Plenary meeting took place in Moscow. The 
Plenary accepted the representation of Ivory Coast that it would no longer issue Kimberley 
Process certificates and thus would suspend the official export of rough diamonds form that 
nation. 
 
December 15, 2005 – UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the import and/or export of 
diamonds from Ivory Coast. 
 
2006 
 
January 1, 2006 – Botswana assumed Chair of Kimberley Process. 
 
March 10, 2006 - NGO Partnership Africa Canada released a report on Brazil, claiming 
roughly half of diamond exports are not accounted for, and therefore, Brazil should be 
suspended from the Kimberley Process. 
 
March 20, 2006 - Brazil's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Jose Mauricio Bustani, stated 
to the Financial Times that "the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Brazil is carrying out new 
inspections in all the mining areas for which Kimberley Process Certificates have been 
granted." 
 
April, 2006 - Following a Kimberley Process Review Mission to Brazil, certain anomalies 
and weaknesses within the country's procedures are noted. The Brazilian Government takes 
swift and affirmative action by suspending its official exports of rough diamonds and is in the 
process of working with the Kimberley Process to remedy the situation as soon as possible. 
Please note Brazil remains a member of the Kimberley Process despite the self enforced 
export ban. 
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June 19-23, 2006 – Botswana hosted the Kimberley Process Intercessional. 
 
November 6-10, 2006 – Kimberley Process Plenary meeting to take place in Gaborone, 
Botswana. 
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8.2 The members of the KPCS  
 
• Angola  
• Armenia  
• Australia  
• Bangladesh  
• Belarus  
• Botswana  
• Brazil  
• Canada  
• Central African Republic  
• China, People's Republic of  
• Congo, Democratic Republic of  
• Congo, Republic of  
• Côte d’Ivoire  
• Croatia  
• European Community  
• Ghana 
• Guinea  
• Guyana 
• India  
• Indonesia  
• Israel 
• Japan 
• Korea, Republic of  
• Lao, Democratic Republic of  
• Lebanon 
• Lesotho  
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• Liberia  
• Malaysia  
• Mauritius  
• Namibia  
• New Zealand 
• Norway 
• Russian Federation  
• Sierra Leone  
• Singapore  
• South Africa  
• Sri Lanka 
• Switzerland 
• Tanzania 
• Thailand 
• Togo 
• Turkey 
• Ukraine 
• United Arab Emirates 
• United States of America  
• Venezuela 
• Vietnam 
• Zimbabwe 
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8.3 Example of the certificate 
 
 
 
Sample of Kimberley Process certificate  
(Source: World Diamond Council, 2007) 
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An example of an invoice with a System of Warranties statement. 
(Source: World Diamond Council, 2007) 
 
 
